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ABSTRACT
Moral Values in Moral Psychology?
A Textual Analysis
Shannon Starks
Department of Psychology, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be
like? While the value-free ideal of science requires at least the bracketing of values in regards to
the conducting of research and influence on its results, this investigation takes seriously the
concerns of leading social psychologists that biases may influence the subdiscipline. Textual
analyses of moral psychology’s literature involving content analysis of codes and cultural
discourse analysis of value themes illuminate values involving moral problems and moral goods
that may inherently influence research at various levels. It is proposed that values are impossible
to eliminate from moral psychological research and that a simple epistemic/nonepistemic value
distinction is inadequate for deciding which values are appropriate. A norm of value disclosure
to replace the norm of the value-free ideal is recommended.

Keywords: moral psychology, value-free science, bias, content analysis, cultural discourse
analysis, epistemic values, ontological dualism
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1
Moral Values in Moral Psychology?
A Textual Analysis
Leading social psychologists have expressed growing concern that political homogeneity
in the subdiscipline may undermine scientific validity by embedding values in research questions
and methods and mischaracterizing groups of people (Duarte et al., 2015). Methods to avert
biases are part of every research program, but even so these researchers think a 10:1 ratio of
liberals to conservatives is problematic for ideologically controversial subject matter—that is,
issues on which there is disparate political disagreement. If their concerns are valid, the subfield
of moral psychology—with subject matter close to the ideological fire—may be plagued by
biases. The value-free ideal of science requires the bracketing of values to avoid biasing research,
yet some scholars assert that value-free science is neither possible nor desirable (e.g., Brinkmann,
2005; Wylie & Nelson, 2007; Yanchar, Gantt, & Clay, 2005). While efforts have been made to
distinguish “appropriate” values from others, theorists work have shown how even those values
necessary to conduct science (epistemic values) can bias research outcomes (Slife & Williams,
1995).
Importantly, other scholars point to ideological controversies throughout the entire field
of psychology, not only in moral or social psychology, and not only due to political homogeneity
(e.g., Morss, 2013; Williams, 2001). For example, assumptions regarding what can be known
have implications for what can exist, and in turn for how things should be, which is easily
ideologically controversial (Couvalis, 1997). According to some psychotherapists, the value of
individualism is a pervasive disciplinary moral outlook with notable ethical blind spots that
trouble critics (Richardson, 2005, p. 26). In accordance with these scholars’ assertions, I argue
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that values biasing moral psychology may represent a larger phenomenon characterizing the
entire field.
Compounding this issue is the value-free ideal, itself a value. Routine checks thought to
adequately expunge biases may hinder researchers and consumers of psychology’s knowledge
from examining inherent values (see Yanchar, Slife, & Warne, 2008). If value assumptions are
inherent, acceptance of the value-free ideal does not afford researchers, students, or public
consumers of psychology a truthful perspective of what findings mean—in short, it could be a
form of deception, whether conscious or not. I attempt to illuminate this potential problem by
investigating values in moral psychology.
I first summarize the evolution of the value-free ideal and discuss the epistemic-nonepistemic values distinction integral to the current value-free ideal. Second, I apply a theoretical
discussion on the significance of values in science to psychology, and more particularly to moral
psychology, attending to potential problems with the value-free ideal. In the third section I
discuss how content and cultural discourse analyses are used to examine moral psychology’s
literature for potential values. In the fourth section I summarize major value themes to illuminate
inherent values with important implications for informing decisions regarding moral debate and
moral obligation. Especially if the concerns of Duarte et al. (2015) are valid, such a systematic
investigation is overdue in moral psychology. In the fifth section I argue that in light of inherent
values in moral psychology, the acknowledgment and disclosure of values is beneficial to the
discipline. While this investigation does not exhaust the broad possibilities for dealing with
values in moral psychology nor explicate details of a program of value disclosure, I argue that
the value-free ideal is a detriment to the subdiscipline and value disclosure is a better alternative.
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Value Ladenness and the Value Free Ideal
Theoretically informed scientists from diverse fields widely acknowledge that the
traditional view of science as value free has been rationally and empirically refuted (e.g.,
Couvalis, 1997; Fleck, 1981; Kincaid, Dupré, & Wylie, 2007; Sampson, 1983; Slife & Williams,
1995), but there is wide disagreement about dealing with inherent values and preserving
objectivity and the validity of science (Kincaid et al., 2007; Loughlin, 2008). Kuhn (1962)
popularized the idea that epistemic values—those valued assumptions necessary for establishing
sound and recognizable disciplinary standards for acquiring knowledge—inherently guide
scientists’ theory choices. Other researchers have noted that nonepistemic values—those not
essential to science—are also inherently influential everywhere in the external parts of science
(e.g., Nagel, 1961). Nonepistemic values guide research topic choices, yet they are necessary for
beginning a study. However, nonepistemic values are thought inappropriate as influencers of
reasoning or evidence in the internal parts of scientific endeavors. Hence, the prevailing valuefree ideal does not mean science has no values, but that the internal stages of science are free of
nonepistemic values (Douglas, 2007).
While epistemic values are presented as unquestionable scientific assumptions in
psychology’s introductory texts (e.g., valuing sensory observation and replication), many
psychologists would argue that nonepistemic values do not inhere in science itself and must be
limited as to where they are allowed to influence science (Haack, 1993; Howard, 1985; Koertge,
2003). For example, the social and moral consequences of research (nonepistemic values) should
not be allowed to interfere with “the intellectual content of either the problems scientists address
or the answers they explore” (Koertge, 2003, p. 225). As one philosopher of science notes,
“discomfort at a belief’s consequences cannot be invoked to refute it” (Ross, 2007, p. 2). The
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biases that students of psychology’s methods are instructed to avoid (e.g., experimenter’s bias in
which a psychologist’s expectations influence how data are interpreted; sponsor effects thought
to plague a high percentage of pharmaceutical studies [Freemantle, 2000]) are considered
nonepistemic.
This epistemic/nonepistemic distinction guides the current conceptualization of a biasfree science (e.g., Howard, 1985), yet scholars point to its inadequacy to guide value standards in
science (Wylie & Nelson, 2007). Competition between epistemic values is inevitable as one
value takes precedence over another. While many researchers would consider their value of
observable and replicable events over nonobservable and nonreplicable events as essential to
good science, other scholars argue that a standard of valuing observation and replication over
other important methods of systematic inquiry hinders and distorts understanding of truth and
knowledge in psychological science (see Slife, Reber, & Richardson, 2009). If, as Ioannidis
asserts (2012, p. 652), “the pursuit of truth remains our main goal in our work as scientists,” I
argue that other so-called epistemic values may interfere.
Further, I maintain that values guiding researcher attention toward one factor over others
inevitably involve subjective preferences with influence well beyond choosing a study topic
(Kincaid et al., 2007). Fleck (1981) demonstrated how a trained scientist’s attention is not
governed by objective properties of the subject matter but instead by the complex social
conditions of training and practice—the resulting body of knowledge could hardly be free of
nonepistemic values. Rorty (1985) has claimed that truth itself emerges directly from contextual
social values, in which case epistemic values would easily assume moral content.
Researching the existing body of knowledge in the psychological literature to frame one’s
study may be considered epistemic—a necessary part of standard disciplinary practice. Yet the
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entire body of literature is shaped by multiple psychologists making nonepistemic-value
decisions about what is worth studying. These decisions would inevitably be influenced by social
considerations beyond established disciplinary standards (e.g., Kincaid et. al, 2007, p. 9).
Finally, I view the difference between epistemic and nonepistemic values as ambiguous.
If valuing social and moral consequences is nonepistemic, then it seems that not valuing social
and moral consequences would also be a nonepistemic value. While some scholars value value
freedom, others value the social and moral responsibility of scientific research (e.g., Douglas,
2007; see also Teo, 2015). While one value will hold sway over the other, neither would seem
more or less inherent or necessary to a program of study than the other.
Given that rival epistemic values require nonepistemic choices, epistemic values
themselves emerge from social values, and the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic
values is ambiguous, I would argue that the distinction is inadequate to guide value standards in
science. Fortunately, scholars have provided other ideas for discerning and evaluating values and
their potential impact.
The Significance of Values in Science
Kincaid et al. (2007, p. 10), offer three other dimensions on which to discern inherent and
implicit values in science—how they are involved, where they are involved, and what effect they
have. The first refers to whether values are inevitable or merely possible and whether values are
implied by findings or implicitly presupposed, influencing research design itself. The second
concerns where in research values are involved—externally (e.g., influencing choice of topics) or
internally (e.g., influencing measures). The third, the effect of values, is possibly the most
important and yet the most difficult to investigate.
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How are values involved in science? If values are not inevitable but merely possible,
they could be expunged. However, if they are inevitable, efforts to expunge them would be
fruitless. Values that are merely implied by findings would not compromise the value-free ideal.
On the other hand, implicitly presupposed values may have an impact on research outcomes,
which has implications for the objectivity of scientific reason and evidence.
Illustrating this first dimension, an immunologist explains how values were inevitable
and implicitly presupposed in his personal experience with experimental science:
[S]tudents are told that one of the most important properties for a scientist to develop is
an uncompromising scrutiny of all observations and opinions encountered in the
professional context . . . guided by pure logical reasoning. In reality, scientific education
is quite different. A young scientist is trained to believe in . . . a host of information
which is impossible to question by logic or to otherwise critically evaluate. . . . That a
competing notion may be equally well supported by evidence is either unconsciously
ignored or actively suppressed (Eichmann, 2008, p. 210).
Eichmann’s (2008) experience may illustrate what Duarte et al. (2015) call a “cohesive
moral community [with a] shared reality [that] blinds its members [to] ideologically undesirable
hypotheses and unanswered but important scientific questions” (p. 8). These social psychologists
point to problematic examples of “value statements wrongly treated as objective truth” (p. 8),
such as measures that ask questions with embedded liberal values. Though the researchers
consider such values unscientific and recommend ways to curb them, Eichmann’s experience
suggests what novice scientists are taught is implicitly value laden from the beginning. It also
illustrates the inevitability of accepting one presupposed notion over competing others, some of
which may be equally well supported. While the self-correcting nature of science allows such

7
values and the notions they support to change, needed change requires considerable struggle in
an environment in which it is impossible to question or critically evaluate cherished values and
notions. This would have implications for moral psychology’s research outcomes.
Where are values found in science? If values are inevitable and implicitly presupposed,
in which aspects of research are they involved? Duarte et al. (2015) are concerned about
selection of research topics as a major risk to scientific validity in a politically one-sided
discipline because researchers may focus on areas that validate their political leanings. But if
value-laden selection of research topics is risky, how much more is validity threatened by values
that determine evidence of confirmation, such as value-laden research measures? Eichmann
(2008, p. 34) describes how persuasion and experience teach scientists to expect certain
outcomes, resulting in a circular relationship between procedure and results. Accordingly, the
values influencing the outcomes of science may be so buried in tradition as to render them
invisible.
Couvalis (1997) notes how such influence reaches to the deepest levels of research: the
acceptable range of scientific explanations are delimited by important metaphysical assumptions,
ideas about what can exist—values, inasmuch as they are preferred over other viable and equally
well supported assumptions. These valued assumptions are not generally explicit but are rather
manifested implicitly in the ways scientists explain and conduct their science (p. 91). Such
presuppositions and their implications may not become apparent without studied efforts at
discerning them, and so in this investigation I pay attention to the possibility of their influencing
both selection of study topics and outcomes of moral psychology research.
What effects do values have in science? Duarte et al. (2015) criticize the influence of
politically one-sided subjective values on research outcomes as a threat to objectivity, such as in
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the mischaracterizing of people within their political affiliations. But scholars argue that not all
subjective values influencing the outcomes of research threaten the validity of science. In fact,
some assert that subjective values, even in the internal parts of science, may serve to make
science valid (e.g., Nozick, 1998). Root (2007) maintains that science is inevitably value laden,
and science constrained by value-free idealism is neither socially relevant nor value free. Further,
Wylie and Nelson (2007) maintain that value-free idealism may hinder scientific objectivity by
restraining consideration of important perspectives. Finally, Douglas (2007) argues for an ethical
science: no scientist in any part of science is exempt from considering the potential consequences
of research, as is born out by the widely accepted valuing of human rights in research practices,
even at the sacrifice of knowledge.
In accordance with these ideas, I assert that scientists are no more able than anyone else
to avoid taking a moral stance, and further, that the “basic norms of moral responsibility and the
reasoning needed to do sound, acceptable science” entail a rejection of the value-free ideal
(Douglas, 2007, p. 135). Instead, I argue, examination of values, including the value-free ideal is
requisite. While I do not attempt to demonstrate the effects of values these scholars have
discussed, I hope my examination of values in moral psychology reveals the pervasiveness of
inherent and implicitly presupposed values, illuminating potential effects to inform an ongoing
dialogue about how to deal with these issues.
Value Ladenness in Psychological Science
Historian of psychology Daniel Robinson (1985) has warned that assuming a scientific
value-free ideal in psychology could result in “fatally defective” assumptions about human
nature (p. 2). While scholars disagree about the proper role of values in psychology (see Tjeltveit,
2015), many agree that psychology is value laden. For example, Danziger (1997) argues that
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psychological categories accepted as objective and universal are culturally motivated rather than
“natural.” These scholars are concerned about the impact of such values, which are not generally
given attention in psychological science. The following section considers inherent value
ladenness in psychological science framed by the three dimensions discussed above (see Kincaid
et al., 2007).
How values are involved in psychological science: Inevitable and implicit? Though
Duarte et al. (2015) suggest valid ways to avoid embedded values and mischaracterizations of
groups in social psychology, other scholars would assert that values will influence research in
spite of such efforts. May (1967) argued that as a scientist, “you see what your microscope or
telescope is focused to take in” (p. 90). Sampson (1983) claims that psychology’s ideas about
justice developed as ideological notions about what should be, with values built in from the
outset, suggesting that in all aspects of psychological science, the questions asked, approaches
employed, and even what constitutes an acceptable answer “reflect something more extensive
than purely scientific curiosity and disinterested neutrality” (p. 4). These psychologists note
implicit values at every level of research—selecting and defining a subject, designing methods,
and explaining the way things are—even intimating the way things should be. If they are right,
the effects of inherent values on researchers and consumers of psychology’s knowledge could
render value examination critical.
While it appears that values are impossible to expunge, it may be possible to exchange or
rearrange them if such action were deemed appropriate. Duarte et al.’s (2015) recommendations
to increase political diversity in social psychology suggest something like this—a balancing of
values rather than their removal. Still, the researchers assume a clear distinction between
“descriptive fact[s]” and “philosophical/ideological” ideas (p. 11) as if the truth psychology’s
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research produces should inhabit a separate realm from the ideological—in other words, it should
be value free. Inasmuch as values in moral psychology are cloaked by this value-free ideal, such
implicitly presupposed values would be less accessible for examination or rearranging.
Where values are involved in psychological science. Morss (2013) argues that the
Western values of positivism, naturalism, and functionalism have a major impact on every aspect
of developmental psychology, focusing the proverbial microscope on presumably progressive
changes to the disregard of meanings and ways of being that do not fit the accepted concept of
“healthy” development. Other psychologists have observed that the value of materialism
increasingly influences psychology so that at every level the discipline is “biologized” (e.g., Slife,
2004; Williams, 2001). Materialism leads logically to the adoption of material treatments—for
example, focusing on neurobiological functioning and depression correlates at the expense of
traditional psychological diagnoses results in an emphasis on pharmacological interventions at
the expense of traditional psychological treatments (Hedges & Burchfield, 2009, p. 99). So
entrenched is this value that though serious limitations frequently plague double-blind,
randomized clinical trials (e.g., “the study sponsor is the strongest predictor of antidepressant
efficacy”, p. 113), there has been no consequential questioning of the efficacy of
pharmacological treatments for depression.
If these scholars’ arguments manifest “ideological claims . . . wrongly treated as objective
truth” (Duarte et al., 2015, p. 9), they suggest that psychological science may be inherently laden
with implicit values at every level—in selecting and defining an area of study, designing study
methods, and explaining the way things are.
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The effects of values in psychological science. Implications for the potential effects of
values may be categorized into three main areas: 1) values as problematic, 2) values as necessary
to good psychological science, and 3) effects of the value-free ideal.
Problems with values in psychological science. While Duarte et al. (2015) point to
potential validity problems created by embedded liberal values due to political one-sidedness in
social psychology, other critics are concerned about values that pervade psychology due to
ideological assumptions embedded still more deeply in the wider culture (e.g., Slife, 2004). For
example, Slife notes problems with hedonism, which posits that the purpose of all behavior is
fundamentally to increase personal pleasure and avoid pain. This favored explanation coheres
with Western values including the prevailing version of natural selection, but since hedonism
does not account for exceptions, researchers must explain away altruistic behavior to fit hedonic
principles or as flukes. Scholars note that professional practice and the experiences of many
therapists and clients are at odds with the very theory that underlies mainstream treatment plans.
If a therapist can only serve a client insomuch as the service brings commensurate self-benefit, at
the very least the purpose of therapy and APA ethical principles (APA, 2010) are confounded
(Slife, 2004).
Values essential for good psychological science. A few theorists argue that though
values may be problematic, they are also necessary for good psychological science to proceed
inasmuch as they make science relevant. Teo (2015) asserts that psychology needs strong moral
values to guide disciplinary practices and ensure that important values do not easily give way to
more transient or trivial values of an irresponsible individual or group. Where trivial values take
precedence, missing perspectives are more likely to be masked, leaving groups of people
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vulnerable to marginalization. Disciplinary values in this sense act to guard against incidental
and undue involvement of the wrong values.
Slife, Reber, and Faulconer (2012) claim that good research requires examined and
explicit contextual values so that researchers know what should take precedence and consumers
of psychology know what researchers consider important. These scholars argue that unexamined
and decontextualized values prevailing in psychology’s research lead to theoretical
inconsistencies and misunderstandings because different kinds of research require different
priorities in values. For example, while it may be apparent that therapists value helping clients to
be mentally healthy, this term could have diverse subcultural value-meanings that should be
made clear to researchers, therapists, clients, and other consumers. Though increasing political
diversity in the discipline may be commensurate with more politically balanced views (Duarte et
al., 2015), arguably even if political views could be balanced, this would not adequately clarify
deeply embedded cultural values so that researchers, therapists, clients, and other consumers
could perceive them and make informed decisions.
Problems with the claim of value-freedom. Because the value-free ideal is implicated in
cloaking these values, its potential problems are considered specifically. The claims of its critics
often fall into three general areas: 1) limits the value-free ideal imposes on science, 2) imposition
of Western values on other cultures in the guise of value-free objectivity, and 3) self-fulfilling
circularity of misguided science sustained by people acting out what they perceive to be valuefree truth.
Limiting science. Yanchar and Slife (1997) argue that psychology’s failure to examine
presupposed values confines it to a narrow view of the world that precludes alternative views.
Danziger (1997, p. 191) notes the impermeability of psychology’s prevailing culturally grounded
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prescriptive social discourse: “Except on a very superficial level, . . . no knowledge with
revolutionary implications could possibly emerge from [investigations].” Cushman (1995)
asserts that psychotherapists unintentionally perpetuate the idea that psychology’s prescriptions
reflect natural facts—the way a person should be. Viewing these established concepts as value
free renders other possibilities essentially beyond reach. Thus, the value-free ideal may impose
important and potentially damaging limitations on disciplinary practices.
Imposing Western values. Notwithstanding limitations, Cushman (1995) suggests that
inasmuch as “psychology is one of the guilds most responsible for determining the proper way of
being human, [it] wields a significant amount of power” (p. 336). Many psychologists have
observed that exporting Western psychology’s prescriptive approach as objective and value free
is a form of cultural imperialism (e.g., Christopher, 2005; Dueck, Ting, & Cutiongco, 2007; Slife
& Reber, 2009; Stam, 2015). Christopher, Wendt, Marecek, and Goodman (2014) report that
without a cultural understanding of psychology, U.S. psychologists who attempted to provide
support in Sri Lanka following the 2004 tsunami violated important cultural norms by
unwittingly exporting Western values in the guise of value-free objectivity. Morss (2013) argues
that such socio-political imperialism has a notable impact on people’s lives and hopes (pp. 4-7)
as it “violently suppress[es] alternative ways of thinking and of being” (p. 51).
Self-fulfilling prophecies. According to Cushman (1995, p. 7), presenting these ideas as
value free in Western and nonwestern cultures alike contributes to potentially harmful selffulfilling circularity in which theories “inevitably reproduce the very cause of the ills they treat,”
which would violate APA ethical principles (APA, 2010). Richards (2002, p. 9) illustrates this
reflexive character of psychology: “[N]obody prior to Freud had an Oedipus complex [and]
nobody before about 1914 had a ‘high IQ.’” The practices of the discipline and consequential
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public response make such concepts real. Dupré (2001) notes that scientists and journalists alike
confidently take advantage of the public conception that “any question that can be answered at
all can best be answered by science” (p. 2), though disseminated explanations of human behavior
are far from value free.
Conclusion. These scholars’ ideas suggest that the value-free ideal is at least as great a
concern as other values involved in psychological science and point to the continued failure of
the discipline to examine or address its implications. This attempt to examine inherent and
implicit values—including the value-free ideal—in moral psychology, is an effort to illuminate
such implications.
Value Ladenness in Moral Psychology
While some view proper psychological science as being aloof from values and criticize
psychologists’ efforts to derive “ought” from “is” (e.g., Kendler, 2002), others see values as
inherent (e.g., Brinkmann, 2005). Haidt (2012) illustrates how moral psychology grew up based
on two basic valued and largely unquestioned assumptions: good moral reasoning is the product
of progressively higher levels of rational thinking, and morality is fundamentally about harm and
fairness. Where the assumptions of this “liberal ideal” have prevailed, researchers have indeed
found what they were trained to find. Haidt (2012) explains, “[B]y using a framework that
predefined morality as justice while denigrating authority, hierarchy, and tradition, it was
inevitable that the research would support worldviews that were secular, questioning, and
egalitarian” (p . 10).
As those traditional ideas have not accounted for important political divisiveness in the
West nor global moral behaviors, researchers have taken note of presumptions behind those
theories. If “careful and honest scientific research” (Haidt, 2012, p. 10) produces findings that
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inevitably support valued presumptions, it seems antithetical to claim that a value-free ideal sets
such research apart from contemporary philosophical, political, or religious discourse. On the
contrary, it seems that scientific research may be implicitly every bit as value laden, and
dangerously so when it is put forth as value free. The assumption of value-free moral psychology
may entrench such presumptions so they are largely ignored.
The value-free ideal in moral psychology . Kendler (2002) draws a sharp
distinction between fact and value, noting that “[s]peculations are free but facts are sacred” (p. 9).
He rejects the notion that psychology can reveal moral principles of human conduct (p. 32),
though it can inform moral policy with reliable information that meets “a more demanding
standard of rationality” (p. 6). However, critics assert that the value-free ideal behind this
distinction is itself part of a biased philosophy and that in adopting it psychology preemptively
biases investigations against certain defensible positions, including theistic ones (Richardson,
2006; Slife & Reber, 2009), much as the implicit assumptions of the liberal ideal discussed
above may have biased research outcomes to support the assumptions themselves. Further,
Williams (2005) asserts that epistemological constraints have rendered psychology ineffective in
its attempts to address matters that matter most in psychology. Moral psychology’s attempts to
address these matters may be hindered by a value-free ideal that positions presupposed values as
the incontrovertible method for discovering anything that can be known.
Social psychologists concerned about biases that inevitably filter into research due to
political one-sidedness advocate political balancing to correct potential problems (see Duarte et.
al, 2015). This desire for such diversity reflects valuing “enhanced creativity, discovery, and
problem solving” (p. 1). It is based on the presupposition that multiple views cancel out distal
views and eventually “converge upon the truth” (p. 5). In moral psychology and elsewhere in the
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discipline, presupposed values appear to be always operating undercover in disciplinary
knowledge that purports to be value free. Some values may make good sense, while others may
not—a good reason to disclose and examine them rather than to claim that good moral
psychology is value free.
Problematic presuppositions, moral psychology, and the value-free ideal. SonugaBarke (2011) cautions developmental psychologists about implicitly assuming what is the right
way to be a human—for example, what is normal, abnormal, or mature. Increasing independence
may be viewed as appropriate in one culture, while ultimate submission to divine authority may
be viewed as appropriate in another. He warns that “what is merely assumed to be the case
becomes presented as self-evidently true” (p. 2), admonishing researchers to examine their
values and readers to read between the lines in order to detect such values and their implications.
Yet valuing such value-disclosure in moral psychology seems to take a backseat to valuing
value-freedom.
Nelson and Slife (2012) describe “deep philosophical difficulties” derived from
disciplinary presuppositions, which are rarely assumed to be values, but are instead assumed to
define science. These psychologists outline some of the problems with methodological value
presuppositions, such as operationalism, lawfulness, and reductionism. The authors assert that
operationalizing all behavior results in data that are often far removed from the actual
phenomenon being studied. Lawfulness excludes anomalies perhaps vital to understanding the
moral implications of religion and spirituality, and reductionism grounds behavior in lower-level
processes ultimately ending in molecular biology. Each of these presuppositions from the outset
excludes God as relevant to human morality and misses important complexities of the human
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mind and social organizations, and each is presumed to cohere with the idea of a value-free
psychological science.
A study of implicit attitudes illustrates potential implications for moral psychology of
inherent disciplinary biases. Reber, Slife, and Downs (2012) found that theistically oriented,
university educated students of psychology moved away from their theistic beliefs as they spent
more time in their program. Students had replaced their original implicit theistic biases with
implicit naturalistic biases—perhaps assuming them to be value free and objective, or at least
less biased and closer to the truth. The findings of these scholars give reason to examine values
in moral psychology.
The present study. Inasmuch as moral psychology purports to supply value-free
knowledge to inform the world’s moral debates and moral obligations, the value-laden ideals of a
“professional subculture” (Danziger, 1997, p. 5) may be sanctioned as unbiased and objective
knowledge, thus obscuring inherent values and their effects. Haidt (2012) shows how political
biases may easily be embedded in moral psychology. But in spite of scholarly concerns about
biases in psychology, systematic investigation of potential implicit values is lacking. Does
research in moral psychology present value-laden findings as if they were objective and value
free? I attempt to systematically address the question and to illuminate shared implicit values that
may have an impact on a litany of concerns of the scholars cited above: limits on what can exist
and what can be known, theoretical consistency, social relevance, prescriptions for right ways of
being human and the imposition of Western values on other cultures, felt moral obligations, and
self-fulfilling circularity. Each of these scholarly concerns relates to efforts toward an objective
understanding of human nature and an objective understanding of what can be done regarding
such nature.
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This study inherently reflects my values as the primary researcher, inseparable from the
context of my mentors and other life experiences. My concerns include authoritative institutions
presenting as definitive scientific findings based on notions of a “fictional nature” (Eichman,
2019, p. 209), censure by the discipline of psychology of specific alternate views, and the tacit
and untenable foreclosure of genuine human purpose in psychology’s explanations. While I find
much in moral psychology’s reports to reflect my own values, they are not the values of all
people, and exporting these findings as natural scientific truth is unjustified and potentially
dangerous. I argue that such practices could unravel much of the good that science, including
psychology, has done in the modern world.
I argue that moral values are inherent in the practices of moral psychology as well as in
all of science—that one can never escape one’s values. However, the impact of values inherent
in psychological science may be of critical importance where the subject matter is both relational
and agentic. For this reason, I hope the discipline of psychology, which has the potential to do a
great deal of good as well as a great deal of damage, will engage in continuing fruitful discourse
about its assumptions and the values it cannot escape.
Based on my understanding of these concerns, I have asked two salient questions: “What
values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like?” and
“Does moral psychology promote values as if they were objective and value free?” In the next
section I describe my own value-laden cultural discourse analysis of moral psychology’s
literature. I hope that this research will call disciplinary attention to implicit values and their
implications, including problems with the value-free ideal, and consequently promote an ongoing
dialogue to address value scrutiny and disclosure as an alternative.
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Method
In this section I describe my efforts at a systematic cultural discourse analysis of implicit
values in 25 highly cited moral psychology research articles (see Quinn, 2005). Content analysis
was also employed to analyze the distribution of implicit values (Bernard & Ryan, 2010).
Discourse analysis and content analysis have long traditions of applying systematic scientific
rigor to analyzing textual data (e.g., Bernard & Ryan, 2010; Wertz et. al, 2011).
In this attempt, my understanding of values in the cultural discourse of moral psychology
is inherently influenced by my assumptions that humans are fundamentally relational and
divinely purposed agents. Just as the discourse of moral psychology is inseparable from the
values of its creators, this discourse is inherently influenced by the values of its researcher and
coders.
Cultural Discourse Analysis of Highly Cited Articles
Since psychology’s scientific community can be viewed as belonging to a culture with
shared meanings, many of which may be implicit, cultural discourse analysis seemed an
appropriate method for getting at the shared values of moral psychology. This analysis derived
meanings from moral psychology’s literature through multiple examinations, beginning with a
list of themes derived from the literature review to guide codebook development. These initial
themes did not so much reflect values themselves as how and where to find values. This project
is not a literature review, as my research aim was to analyze the cultural discourse carefully
crafted to please editors and leaders in the discipline in order to illuminate the meanings of
potential biases. I attempt to reconstruct tacit value assumptions from the raw data of disciplinary
reports—in other words, I seek to understand what, for the psychologists who write these reports,
is the right way to think about and understand people.
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Content Analysis
Content analysis involved analyzing each paragraph as a unit for the presence of each
value in the code system derived through the preliminary analysis (see Bernard & Ryan, 2010,
pp. 287-310). A member of the research team experienced in cultural discourse analysis and
content analysis provided initial training, and the primary researcher trained a second coder. The
development of the code system is described below. Interrater reliability was established by
Cohen’s kappa.
Highly Cited Articles in Moral Psychology
Since I wanted this analysis to reflect what is widely accepted at the center of moral
psychology, the selection process favored the most highly cited empirical research. Selection
began with a PsychINFO journal search consisting of “moral*” in the title OR in the abstract,
using limiters peer-reviewed and years 2005-2015. Limiting by publication showed which
psychology journals focusing on empirical articles produced the most search hits for the above
criteria, and the top five were selected (number of hits in parentheses): Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology (99), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (73), Psychological
Science (59), Personality and Individual Differences (59), and Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin (57).
A Web of Science search followed, first using criteria “moral*” in the title OR as an
author identifier with the same year limiter 2005-2015. This search was refined by the source
titles listed above. I then selected “create citation report,” saved the top 100 records to an Excel
file, and sorted by average number of citations per year. I selected the top 30 after removing
duplicate authors. The top 25 of these articles comprise the raw data of analysis (see Table 1).
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The bottom five articles provided material for coding practice and example passages for the final
codebook. Researchers used the software, MAXQDA, to aid in coding and analysis.
Developing a Codebook and Coding Data
Initial coding for implicit values was informed by two main theoretical ideas drawn from
the literature review: 1) The inevitability and implicitness of values, and 2) The value of value
freedom. They are briefly explained here.
Inevitability and implicitness of values. Though researchers are taught to explain and
justify their methods, some values may be hidden because they belong to value systems assumed
to be the way things are. Even when justification is provided for specific practices, hidden values
may lurk under the justification itself. Uncovering implicit “shoulds” illuminates hidden values
and helps in discerning whether they are inevitable and implicitly presupposed. For example,
why should anyone do a particular study? Implicit “shoulds” may emerge in at least these areas:
1) motives for research, 2) motives for methods, 3) ideal or preferred ways of being human, and
4) values manifested in interpretation of data.
The value of value-freedom. Since the value-free ideal is widely valued in psychology,
its importance as a value warrants disciplinary attention. It is also likely to be assumed, tacit, and
unquestioned. Keywords and phrases (e.g., objective, scientific, bias), justifications of scientific
validity, and authoritative universal pronouncements may manifest the value-free ideal.
Evolution of codebook. The above ideas guided a search for values from which to
develop an initial taxonomy of value themes. I scrutinized the seven most highly cited articles
several times for value meanings in metaphors, keywords, ideas, and ways of reasoning. For
example, “harm” was a theme that emerged in examining motives for research, as all of the
articles manifested an implicit idea of hope to diminish some kind of harm to humans. Each
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examination informed ongoing changes to the codebook, which included coding aids such as
inclusion and exclusion criteria for each theme (Table 2).
Two researchers examined the initial codebook and the sample articles for consistency of
meanings and thoroughness, adjusting codes and criteria as needed. Further iterations continued,
with researchers consulting until codes consistently reflected the data. After several codebook
revisions it became apparent that the codebook needed to include codes that contrasted with the
dominant codes in order to provide critical comparisons to aid in discerning implicit values (see
Slife et al., 2009). This iterative process continued and included recording memos—ideas,
thoughts, and impressions—to help with and explain coding decisions.
Final codebook and data analysis. The final codebook included 11 dominant codes and
11 alternate codes representing three major categories: value-free science (e.g., dualism,
universality), understanding morality (e.g., mechanistic morality, natural rationality), and good
vs. bad (natural harm, better world; see Table 2). Coding involved several training sessions as
well as independent coding practice on the last five articles from the list. This codebook included
example passages, search keywords, lists of related codes, and example rationales to help with
coding. When a level of consistency was achieved between coders, the first coder analyzed the
first 25 articles using the final codebook. The second coder randomly selected five of those
articles and independently followed the same process. The first coder’s data were used in the
cultural discourse analysis. This analysis provided insight into the distribution of cultural values
shared across authors of moral psychology’s reports (see Quinn, 2005, p. 47).
Analysis and Results
In this project I address two broad questions: “What values, if any, is moral psychology
based on with regard to what humans should be like?” and “Does moral psychology promote
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values as if they were objective and value free?” This involved analyzing each paragraph as a
unit, using the developed codebook for content analysis, as well as cultural discourse analysis of
value themes in the texts. The latter analysis first discusses manifestations of value-free science
in terms of ontological dualism. It next discusses other values in terms of moral problems and
moral goods, pointing to summary tables to help provide a broader picture of how these value
themes are manifested in moral psychology’s research reports.
Content Analysis of Codes
Since codes were overlapping rather than mutually exclusive, interrater reliability for
dominant codes was established individually by Cohen’s kappa. These kappas and their means
across articles appear in Table 3. Because alternate codes had few hits and almost no agreement,
there was no appropriate statistical test for analyzing them. Statistical analysis of dominant codes
yielded an overall interrater reliability of 0.3032. Readers should be aware that the highest
agreement between coders often results in the lowest kappa values, due to the high percentage of
appearance of these codes in the reports (e.g., Universality, Dualism) and the fact that this
greatly increases the probability used to assess Cohen’s kappa.
Since many of the codes are largely implicit, it is difficult to establish precise locations
for their appearance in the articles. Interrater reliability based on a paragraph as a unit of analysis
may not be the best reflection of agreement. Both coders found most of the dominant codes in all
of the articles, a summary of which can be seen in Table 3. Table 4 summarizes frequency for the
first coder’s data, and details of the content analysis are found in Table 5.
Unused codes. Alternate codes were added to help in discerning implicit values (see
Slife et al., 2009), not because these categories were found in the texts when developing the
codebook. Some of these contrasting codes were found occasionally during the coding process,
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but a few were not. “Holism,” which assumes the impossibility of objectivity independent of
subjectivity, was not found. “Understanding,” here meaning independent from prediction, was
not found in that all reports manifested the idea that prediction was a necessary component of
understanding morality. “Contextuality,” referring to non-universal and possibly nonrecurring
particulars, was also not found in that all reports manifested the aim to discover universally
applicable principles governing moral behaviors and judgments. Finally, “Intentional types,” the
idea that the delineation of types inherently involves genuine intentions, was not found.
Alternate codes and coding discrepancies. Coding of alternate codes resulted in the
greatest discrepancies (see Table 5). The second coder thought Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis
(2005) manifested “Aloofness,” or a lack of values other than scientific curiosity, in 30
paragraphs. This code was juxtaposed against the code “Better World,” which was applied to
researchers’ values about what humans should or should not be like—in other words what they
would be like in a better world. In the codebook, exclusion criteria for “Aloofness” states,
“Attempts to manifest aloof scientific curiosity when anything in the article implies a better or
worse way of being human.” Given that the researchers manifest strong concerns about “deep
moral cleavages” and lack of cooperation, the second coder did not code these paragraphs as
“Aloofness.”
Similarly, the second coder coded Gray and Wegner’s (2009) caution against
unwarranted generalization of their findings and Skitka et al.’s (2005) recognition of differing
moral convictions with “Situated rationality,” which refers to thinking and behavior inextricable
from genuine contextual meaning. This coder also viewed passages about differing moral
convictions to reflect “Meaningful morality” rather than “Mechanistic morality.” The first coder
viewed the caution to mean that more scientific research is needed before universal principles
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can be clearly understood and references to differing convictions to reflect a lawful (natural)
view of rationality based on efficient causal mechanisms, since the researchers manifest in their
report a mechanistic view of morality. In the same vein, the second coder coded 14 paragraphs in
Skitka et al. (2005) as “Cultural harm,” as they reflect differing views of harm. I view these
passages to reflect researchers’ acknowledgement that subjective views differ and the
simultaneous assertion that “really real” harm has universal status (Shweder, 1991, p. 64).
According to the codebook, “Cultural Harm” applies when “what counts as harmful or not
harmful is inextricable from cultural values and meanings.” Discrepancies may reflect the need
for codebook clarification or ambiguity of values in the reports themselves.
Cultural Discourse Analysis of Value Themes
Routine reading of these reports is unlikely to draw out the nuances of implicit meanings
and potential value themes. Though the content analysis shows a distribution of potential values,
it does not capture the meanings of more specific value themes. Guided by the coding, the
primary researcher scrutinized the texts for these specific value themes (see Quinn, 2005, p. 47).
Under the value-free science category, the dominant codes are manifested in abundance in every
article, and most are widely recognized in moral psychology as scientific protocol. The value
meanings involved in these codes are manifested in the other major categories of the codebook—
in the ways researchers understand morality and what people should be like. To avoid a great
deal of redundancy, my report of my cultural discourse analysis does not discuss specifically the
value-free science codes except for “Dualism.” This code requires explication because it is rarely
recognized or acknowledged, and it is ideal for showing the prevalence of the value-free ideal
and answering the question of how best to obtain disciplinary knowledge. Since most passages of
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text were assigned multiple codes and there is substantial overlap between code meanings, most
value themes do not match individual codes.
The codes represent general values found in the preliminary search. When all the texts
were coded, there were more than 10,000 coded passages. To get at the moral value themes
potentially involved in the cultural discourse of moral psychology, passages for each code were
scrutinized separately, and specific value themes emerged (see Table 6 for a sample of major
themes). For example, within passages coded “Harm,” specific kinds of moral evils and moral
goods became apparent. Moral problems and goods appeared under every code, and these were
categorized into subthemes. To keep track of these emerging themes, I created summary tables
including relevant passages with citations. This was an ongoing iterative process as each passage
was scrutinized, and some tables are highly redundant. Those included in this report highlight the
themes I thought were most salient in representing how moral psychologists understand morality
and what they think humans should be like. My values are reflected in decisions about how to
categorize within larger themes and decisions regarding which implications are included.
Value-free science. Most who consider the codes under value-free science to be values
would consider them to be epistemic—scientific protocol for producing value-free science. But
dualism is rarely recognized or acknowledged, and it well represents value-free science in this
analysis. Ontological dualism assumes two independent realities in which an objective realm
exists completely free of influences from the other subjective realm (Slife et al., 2012, p. 726).
The two interact, such as when subjective meaning is assigned to objective reality, but they
remain fundamentally separate (p. 728). Each article manifests objective/subjective dualism in at
least implying that human moral understanding, reasoning, and judgments are subjective and
biased, while at the same time presenting findings about moral understanding, reasoning, and
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judgments as value-free scientific knowledge—as if value-free methods effectively expunged
researchers’ biases (see Table 7). Results “demonstrate” the validity of principles and “reveal”
reality, while people “construe” and have “notions.” Even though some researchers acknowledge
their findings as tentative, this is not an admission of inherent values but rather a suggestion that
further value-free data will eventually clarify and refine objective principles.
For example, Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008) report, “activating intuitions about
cleanliness” reduces “moral condemnation” (p. 1222). The moral condemnation people engage
in is clearly biased and belongs to the subjective realm, but the researchers assert that moral
condemnation is reduced by environmental cues as if this were a fact—a value-free concept. The
meaning of “condemnation” and the desire to demonstrate the irrationality of moral judgments
are ostensibly freed from human subjectivity by value-free methods.
Similarly, Helzer and Pizarro (2011) provide objective “evidence” of subjective
“hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior stemming from irrelevant cues (p. 517).
Researchers’ values, which would be inherent in the meaning of “hypervigilant,” are supposedly
expunged from the “evidence,” as is the researchers’ motivation to demonstrate the unwarranted
nature of such judgments. In another example of ontological dualism, Gray and Wegner (2009)
assert that “in the mind of the perceiver” (p. 507), moral victims and moral benefactors are
inversely conceptualized. The demonstration of this objective and universal principle via valuefree methods is supposedly undistorted by any subjective values in the mind of the researcher.
Such ontological dualism reflects the belief that moral psychology produces value-free,
and therefore unbiased and valid, knowledge—in direct opposition to judgments resulting from
subjective beliefs. Checks for biases, replication, random assignment, and control groups are
among the methods these researchers use to ensure that subjectivity does not influence their data.
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Whether or not ontological dualism is acknowledged, it is a dominant manifestation of the valuefree ideal in moral psychology (see Slife et al., 2012, p. 740).
Moral problems and moral goods. Important value themes emerging from this analysis
fall under the umbrella of how morality should be understood and what humans should be like.
Tables 8-10 highlight themes that specifically concern moral problems and imply moral goods.
Since most researchers articulate specific real world problems but only imply their own concern
about them and some researchers scrupulously avoid value-laden language, their concerns and
values must be inferred. The descriptions in this section are meant to elucidate the reasons I think
these problems reflect researchers’ concerns and values. One manifestation of such implicit
values is researchers’ suggestions for alleviating moral problems. Table 8 summarizes moral
problems and researchers’ suggestions for alleviating them. Table 9 specifies for each article
researchers’ implied ideas of what counts and does not count as “Harm,” which may have salient
implications for the value-free ideal in moral psychology. Table 10 summarizes clashing moral
views between liberals and conservatives, a prevalent issue in many of these reports. The themes
highlighted here involve important shoulds about life, death, and social costs—not merely
problems, but moral problems.
Since virtually all of these moral problems and moral goods involve relationships, and
virtually all of the affirmed sources of these problems and goods are ultimately mechanistic, they
are discussed here under two nonexclusive general themes: problems with relationships and
problems based in mechanistic morality.
Relational problems and goods. Nonexclusive themes addressed under relational issues
include inequality, harsh judgment, dishonesty, intentional harm, and clashing moral views.
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Inequality. At least half of the articles mention or elucidate social problems associated
with inequality, and the terms used in these reports indicate that inequality is viewed as a social
problem with moral implications. Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2007) raise “an important
social psychological question: Why do so many people tolerate—and even celebrate—a system
that benefits relatively few at the expense of the majority” (p. 267)? This question is important
not only because “people are psychologically distressed by the presence of unjustified
inequality” (p. 267), but because benefitting a few at the expense of many is a social evil about
which these researchers care deeply. Their studies concern how “the privileged minority find
ways of relieving their consciences and seeing their privileges as fully legitimate” (p. 267),
implying that such privilege lacks legitimacy while pangs of conscience may indeed stem from
legitimate wrong. The researchers test the effect of “system-justifying” manipulations designed
to reduce such distress, showing that “the palliative effects of ideology may well lead to
acquiescence and a withdrawal of support for social change and the redistribution of resources”
(p. 268). Redistribution is thus a moral good that would help to right an existing moral wrong,
and these studies are employed to find how to avoid acquiescence to an unfair system and to
sustain support for social change, which depends on sustaining moral outrage, a motivator of
action “designed to help the underprivileged” (p. 268). Further, the researchers explain, ideology
that dampens moral outrage preserves “a distorted image of reality” by making the world appear
fairer than it really is (p. 273). System justification and distortion of reality, then, are shored up
by ideology. “Reality,” or the view that equal distribution of resources is right, is viewed as a
good, while distortion of reality—or the view that privilege is justified—is viewed as bad.
“Reality” itself is grounded in morality.
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How the status quo is defended in a system of “haves” and “have-nots” is, according to
Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky (2010), a “question that lies at the heart of the social sciences”
(p. 743), yet it is also a question of moral good and evil. In their study of moral hypocrisy among
powerful members of society, the have-nots are “victims” of social inequality (p. 743). The
researchers’ experimental manipulation is designed to show that inducing a sense of power
increases entitlement in cheating and legal offenses while increasing stringency toward these
behaviors in others. This hypocrisy along with the finding that inducing feelings of low power or
illegitimate power results in hypercrisy (self-stringency and other-leniency) leads the researchers
to assert that this pattern “perpetuate[s] social inequality” (p. 737). They further clarify their
view that social inequality is a moral evil by offering ideas for revealing the “illegitimacy of the
power distribution” and “curb[ing] self-enrichment by the powerful” (p. 743). As an alternative
to open revolt, the researchers suggest “tainting [the powerful’s] reputation” through gossip and
derision, thus inspiring their reform (p. 743).
Another form of social inequality considered a moral evil is gender inequity. Heflick,
Goldenberg, Cooper, and Puvia (2011) find that manipulating participants to focus on
appearance results in lower perceptions of warmth, competence, and morality for female but not
male targets. The researchers suggest that evolved mechanisms are behind this phenomenon, but
argue that denying women these basic human characteristics dehumanizes them and puts them at
an unfair disadvantage in a society that places a high value on appearances (p. 573). Further, they
assert, these effects also result in self-objectification with its host of associated negative effects
(p. 572). The researchers explain that in addition to people being distressed at being
dehumanized, the human characteristics are important to interpersonal perceptions in that people
respond to others based on perceived intentions and capabilities: “low competence and low
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warmth groups . . . are treated with active harm and passive neglect, and elicit contempt and
disgust,” suggesting real-world conditions that contribute to “unique, negative consequences for
women” (p. 579). The researchers are concerned about the high cultural emphasis on women’s
appearance resulting in things that ought not to be (p. 579).
Though the other studies in this investigation do not focus specifically on inequality,
many of them refer to related constructs in the context of harmful behaviors. For example, Tybur,
Lieberman, and Griskevicius (2009) focus on disgust but manifest concern for its implications in
terms of prejudice, social exclusion, stigma, and ethnocentrism (p. 104). Similarly, Zhong,
Strejcek, and Sivanathan (2010) are concerned about “unintended consequences” of everyday
cleanliness reminders for discrimination and prejudice (p. 859). Graham, Haidt, and Nosek
(2009) associate political ideology with a number of evils related to inequality (e.g., racism,
fascism, stigma, acceptance of inequality), and Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) include as
immoral behaviors greed, prejudice, sexism, racism, and taking advantage of the poor.
Others mention these and related behaviors, clearly with the intended meaning that
inequality is a moral evil that should be addressed (e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013;
Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Skitka et al., 2005). Aquino,
Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) suggest one way to avoid immoral behaviors such as
selfishness: “[H]aving salient situational cues available” (p. 139) could help people maintain
access to their moral identity.
The influence of valuing equality and disvaluing inequality in this research figures at
least in research emphases and explanations of findings, which seem to reflect public concerns
inherently constituted at least partly by culture. While it may be impossible from these reports to
assess exactly what counts as equality and inequality or to know the hierarchical structure of
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priorities, it is likely that what counts and what is most important reflect cultural and personal
moral values about what is right and what is wrong in human relationships. Hence, what science
“shows” us in all of these reports would be value laden.
Harsh judgment. An area of human relationships that concerns many researchers is moral
judgment of others’ behaviors. While none of these reports directly expresses that harsh moral
judgment is immoral, some researchers imply it is wrong and at least potentially harmful. Tybur
et al. (2009) hint that the need to understand the origin of our moral emotional responses stems
from the idea that some “attitudes relating to particular social phenomena” ought to be changed
(p. 118)—some moral judgments are unduly extreme, such as disgust-induced phobias and
prejudices leading to avoidance of norm violators. The idea that it is wrong to judge others
harshly may drive Helzer and Pizarro’s (2011) efforts to derogate specific harsh moral judgments
as unreasonable by demonstrating a “deep link” between physical cleanliness and moral
judgments of sexual behaviors (p. 517). Similarly, Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011) show that
tasting a bitter drink increases the harshness of moral judgments, claiming their results
demonstrate “how abstract concepts like morality could originate from sensory experiences” (p.
298). Conversely, Lee and Schwarz (2010) show that inducing cleanliness softens participants’
judgments of others’ moral misdeeds. If such findings constituted value-free reality, the reason
of morality could legitimately be called into question, providing fuel for moral judgments against
harsh moral judgments.
Schnall et al. (2008) find “activating intuitions about cleanliness” can “reduce the
severity of moral judgments” that stems from disgust (p. 1222). They demonstrate how people
make judgments about right and wrong based on intuitions “incidental and irrelevant to the
object or situation being judged” (p. 1222). However, the researchers do not attribute their own
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judgment about the wrongness of these moral judgments to incidental and irrelevant intuitions:
“Recent studies have demonstrated that experimentally induced feelings of disgust can attach
themselves to moral judgments, leading the person to conclude that a particular moral action is
quite wrong” (p. 1219, italics added). Objective scientific findings support their view that such
moral judgments are unduly severe.
Taking aim at “the moralization of purity,” Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, and Cohen (2009, p.
963) draw natural boundaries around different types of morality and demonstrate “the role of
disgust in perceptions of moral goodness” (p. 973). They find that inducing disgust but not anger
or sadness increases the harshness of judgments of purity but not harm violations. They also find
that people high in disgust sensitivity (DS) mete out significantly harsher punishments
exclusively to violators of purity issues than do those high in trait anger or trait fear. Hence, their
findings “yield strong evidence” of “the specificity of the disgust-purity association,” supporting
the theory that purity is “an evolved psychological foundation guiding judgments of right and
wrong” (p. 972). Apart from disgust, the researchers find that participants lower in SES “attach
greater moral significance to violating values of purity” (p. 970), suggesting that “lower SES
individuals include purity concerns in their conception of morality, whereas upper SES
individuals limit their sense of morality to concerns over harm and justice” (p. 973).
Uniquely associating moral judgments of purity issues with disgust and with those lower
in socio-economic resources is one way to draw the important natural boundaries between types
of moralization. Though different scientifically supported boundaries with different aims could
be drawn, the researchers find no reason to question their framework, as their research is
grounded in value-free methods. However, they suggest that framing makes an important
difference to the subjective cultural renditions of morality. Regarding complex issues that span
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several domains, they suggest that framing an issue “as a matter of justice or harm” rather than
“in terms of purity” should dissociate the effects of disgust on moral judgments (Horberg et al.,
2009, p. 973).
Seven studies by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) underscore the boundaries
between two moral systems: one proscriptive and associated with harsh demands, moral blame,
negative self-monitoring, and “lifestyle issues” such as legal abortion and gay marriage, the other
prescriptive and associated with individual discretion, moral credit, positive obligations, and
“equity issues” such as affirmative action and welfare (p. 535). While they acknowledge the
problems of both systems “for advancing morality” (p. 535), their findings imply that a
proscriptive system is likely to lead to a society in which the weight lies in monitoring of
behaviors, whereas a prescriptive system places more weight on moral dispositions than on
behaviors, leading to a society with a proclivity toward morality (p. 529). Further, the researchers’
approbation and disapproval is clear in their respective characterization of these systems:
“condemnatory versus commendatory, blameworthy versus credit-worthy” (p. 534). Scientific
findings may influence such approbation and disapproval without discrediting the value-free
ideal, but it is plausible that valuing and disvaluing specific types of moral systems or moral
judgments of specific issues from the beginning influence the focus of the proverbial microscope
and limit where boundaries are allowed to be drawn in research itself.
Other researchers similarly strive to characterize severe moral judgments of particular
types: Zhong et al. (2010) demonstrate that inducing cleanliness “licenses severe moral
judgments on morally contested issues such as abortion and pornography” (p. 859). Heflick et al.
(2011) discuss moral ramifications of appearance-focus and the accompanying judgment of
females as being less moral. Lammers et al. (2010) condemn moral hypocrisy in which the
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powerful mete out severe judgments against “victims” of an unjust system while simultaneously
feeling licensed to behave immorally (p. 743). These reports are presented as value-free
knowledge gained through value-free scientific methods. At the same time, researcher values—
ranging from apparent to implicit—are manifested in ways that leave open the possibility of
influence from the outset of scientific study.
Intentional harm. Another relational theme running through moral psychology’s research
reports involves the wrongness of intentionally causing harm or allowing harm to vulnerable
others. Skitka et al. (2005) situate their assessment of moral convictions and accompanying
intolerance in the context of “horrific” real-world acts of violence and their justification (p. 895).
Their hope to contribute to “a greater social psychological understanding of morality” stems
from “an increasing awareness that many forms of social conflict appear to be rooted in deep
moral cleavages and . . . fundamental questions of right and wrong” (p. 915). Their research
provides “evidence” supporting the idea that “maximum moral engagement” is a necessary
prerequisite for such moral evils (p. 914). Associating moral convictions with horrific intentional
moral evils could easily put a nail in the coffin for attempts to justify such attitudes. Did these
researchers’ attitudes contribute to their scientific research findings? Proponents of the value-free
ideal would flinch at the prospect, and yet framing the characteristics of moral convictions in this
manner is an effective way to wholly undermine their justification. Such ideas should not plague
value-free research, but a moral psychology with implicit presuppositions and inherent moral
values could produce findings influenced by such intentions.
The wrongness of intentional harm is used to delineate other moral evils: Graham et al.
(2009) associate political ideology with racism, fascism, stigma, acceptance of inequality, and
violence. An item measuring the relative importance of the researchers’ Harm/care moral
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foundation is a contextless and absolute denunciation of killing other people. While many people
may hold the conviction that agreeing to the killing of others is evidence of a harmful attitude
and lack of caring, the idea is laden with moral value. Researchers’ values may unwittingly
influence what passes for objective knowledge.
Most researchers are less absolute in denouncing intentional harm but clearly disvalue it:
Aquino et al. (2009) refer to “the barbarism of a tyrant like Saddam Hussein” to represent the
immoral pole of a “convenient” falsely dichotomous perception that some people are moral and
others immoral (p. 123). The moral pole consists of “actions that demonstrate social
responsiveness to the needs and interests of others” (p. 124), termed “prosociality” and clearly a
moral good for many researchers. Autonomy violations from Sachdeva et al. (2009) refer to
administering shocks and taking advantage of the poor (p. 523) as ostensibly immoral behaviors
that induce moral cleansing. For Shu, Gino, and Bazerman (2011), “dehumanizing victims” (p.
331) and “hurtful behaviors” like cheating on a spouse or standing by instead of stopping
“atrocious acts” (p. 345) manifest moral disengagement. Wakslak et al. (2007) refer to victims
that suffer because less vulnerable others withdraw support for social change. These researchers
imply that violence and other forms of intentional harm are moral evils—that nobody should do
them or idly watch them happen if they can help to prevent them (see also Conway & Gawronski,
2013; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Jordan et al., 2011; Lammers et al.,
2010; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).
Dishonesty. Forms of lying, cheating, and stealing are frequently used to represent
harmful behaviors in research measures and scenarios (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2009; Hutcherson
& Gross, 2011; Tybur et al., 2009) or manipulated as part of a study (e.g., Jordan et al., 2011;
Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Lammers et al., 2010;). Sachdeva et al. (2009) explain that when people
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cheat, they feel the need for moral cleansing to feel better about themselves. Leach et al.’s 2007
assertion that in-group morality is more important than competence or sociability is explained in
terms of trustworthiness and sincerity: “immoral competence is dangerous, and immoral
sociability is disingenuous” (p. 236). Jordan et al.’s (2011) research manipulation caused
participants to cheat more or less, demonstrating that morality is manipulable and dynamic.
These researchers seem to disvalue dishonesty.
Nearly all of these researchers at least mention some aspect of dishonesty in relation to
harm or immorality, and research findings may be influenced by this moral value. However, they
may have differing ideas about what dishonesty means. Aquino et al. (2009) set harmful
dishonest behavior in context of a broader sense of dishonesty: “people are especially likely to
act in ways that are harmful to others in situations in which such behavior can be rationalized” (p.
123). Rationalization involves an attempt to justify a behavior that goes against one’s
understanding of right and wrong. In this sense, rationalizing itself is dishonest. Wakslak et al.
(2007) consider assuaging the distressing emotions that might lead to system change to be a form
of rationalization in which people justify doing nothing to help the disadvantaged. This, then, is
also a form of dishonesty.
Shu et al. (2011) share this broader understanding of dishonesty, including abusing a
controlled substance, cheating on a spouse, and victim blaming as behaviors resulting from
moral disengagement and self-justification invoked to alleviate dissonance caused by behaving
immorally. While they implicate dishonest behavior itself as the catalyst for moral
disengagement, they note, “seemingly innocuous aspects of the environment can promote the
decision to act honestly or dishonestly” (p. 345). Thus, the researchers advocate increasing
awareness of ethical standards by simple means such as honor codes. “[S]eemingly innocuous”
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implies potentially dangerous—due to resulting dishonest behaviors—clearly a moral concern.
Advocating awareness of ethical standards is no less a moral concern.
While value-laden moral intuition is seen as a less reliable guide than value-free scientific
research in predicting dishonest behavior, value-laden intuition seems to be a necessary
condition of any meaning of dishonest behavior or morality in general. In moral psychology
research the meanings of dishonesty and morality vary. Zhong et al. (2010) have a different
understanding of dishonesty; they include adultery and recreational drug use on a survey that
measures severity of judgment against “morally contested issues” (p. 859), or “social behaviors
[that] engender no real danger to others” (p. 862). Such varying views of honesty and morality
could have important implications for moral psychology’s findings and their influence on
consumers.
Clashing moral views. In some cases of clashing views, moral psychologists manifest
distress. Sachdeva et al. (2009) are concerned that moral licensing leads to less willingness to
cooperate, while Skitka et al. (2005) view “deep moral cleavages” as seedbeds for intolerance
and horrific violence (p. 915). Leach et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of in-group morality,
noting its implications for intergroup relations. These researchers manifest the view that people
ought to get along, not mind being with people of differing views, not judge each other harshly,
and work together for good.
Feinberg and Willer (2013) consider poor communication between political groups a
detriment to the advancement of proenvironmental action. Since liberal ideology seems to reflect
proenvironmental attitudes, the researchers’ studies aim to “improve communication between
opposing sides” (p. 61) by reframing environmental messages for conservatives, who may be at a
different “stage of moral development” (p. 57). Indeed, the researchers’ efforts successfully
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“reduce the gap between liberals and conservatives in environmental concerns” (p. 56). Not only
are clashing views a moral problem that needs solving, but this solution seems to involve
directing views toward a specific moral good.
Table 10 provides passages from several articles as the authors articulate clashing views
between liberals and conservatives. Many of these focus on the empirically supported unique
association between conservative views, disgust, and unduly severe judgments of purity
violations such as deviant sexual behaviors. For example, Eskine et al. (2011) assert that
conservatives are more disgusted and make harsher moral judgments because they are more
vulnerable than liberals to the influence of “extraneous emotions” irrelevant to the judgments
themselves (p. 298). Helzer and Pizarro (2011) find that in conservatives but not liberals,
common cleanliness reminders increase disgust and “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual
behavior (p. 517). What counts as “hypervigilant” or too severe is ostensibly a statistically
derived and objective aggregate level of severity of conservative as compared to liberal moral
judgment, though it may imply values regarding how disturbed people ought or ought not to be
about specified things.
Horberg et al. (2009) also manifest concern about the clash between liberal and
conservative views, in particular the condemnation associated with moral judgments in regards
to specific issues exclusively linked to disgust and conservative ideology. Like Feinberg and
Willer (2013), they suggest reframing these issues in terms of freedom and rights instead of
purity in order to reduce conservatives’ amplification of moral judgments caused by disgust,
implying that such a change would be a moral good. Condemnatory morality is also a concern of
Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009), who associate a harsh proscriptive system with conservatives who
regulate “lifestyle” behaviors (p. 535). Conversely, they associate liberal views with prescriptive
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positive “equity” obligations, using their studies to show that such a system is conducive to
dispositional morality—a more moral society (p. 535). Not surprisingly, their study on clashing
views has a prescriptive flavor: ideology associated with dispositional morality and a more moral
society can hardly be found unworthy.
Whereas Haidt and others worry about political bias in social psychology research
(Duarte et. al, 2015), it is illuminating to survey terms used in the Graham et al. (2009) report to
describe the differences between the two ideologies said to undergird America’s intractable
“culture war” (p. 1029). Drawing on theory and empirical research, the researchers call attention
to the association of racism, fascism, blind obedience, and stigma to the “binding foundations”
thought to be the special province of conservative ideology. They explain, “the two core aspects
of conservative ideology are resistance to change and acceptance of inequality” (p. 1030). On the
other hand, while they acknowledge that the “individualizing foundations” thought to be
especially important to liberals may be associated with both justice and blood feuds, this
ideology involves an optimistic view, openness to experience, and an emphasis on fairness and
care (p. 1030).
The empirically supported boundaries between these types provide validity for moral
foundations theory, which the authors believe is “the best starting point” for identifying “the
most important sources of moral intuition across cultures” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1041) and a
“useful way to conceptualize and measure [moral] convictions” (p. 1042). Indeed, moral
foundations theory informs most of the reports analyzed in the present investigation. In testing
the theory, psychologists would expect to produce value-free data from which value-free
findings are drawn to inform people about the “really real” truth about moral intuitions and
moral convictions (Shweder, 1991, p. 64). Under this assumption, one might allow that if the
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value-free findings in this report lead people to value liberal ideology and disvalue conservative
ideology, it is because those individuals value fairness, care, optimism, and openness over racism,
fascism, stigma, and inequality—not because inherent values guide the research that delineates
the boundaries between ideologies.
However, if the specific concerns of Duarte et al. (2015) are realized and liberal values
are inadvertently embedded in research on political differences, findings may reflect researchers’
ideology. The meaning of harm in the Graham et al. (2009) report is worth exploring as it applies
to clashing views between liberals and conservatives. As discussed above under “intentional
harm,” the researchers use four items for each of five moral domains to measure its relative
importance. An item measuring the harm domain, which is supposed to be less important to
people with conservative ideology, is stated as an absolute wrong regardless of context: “It can
never be right to kill a human being” (p. 1044). If this item alone eliminates a number of research
participants from appearing to care a great deal about harm and care, it effectively influences the
boundaries drawn around categories that pass for natural types in moral psychology’s reports.
The importance of what does not count as harm for these researchers may be more
implicit. They note, “many issues related to food, sex, clothing, prayer, and gender roles [are
treated] as moral issues even when they involve no harm to any person” (Graham et al., 2009, p.
1030, italics added). Even if research participants do not count these things as harmful in the
same way as killing, it is possible that some items count as harm or not harm in ways
inaccessible to the presuppositions of this research. The meaning of harm may be poorly
understood, as may be the case with care, fairness, respect, and other domain terms. With these
terms lacking objective meanings, it seems likely that the respective measures would reflect
inherent assumptions and values, thus unavoidably biasing results.
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Problems based in mechanistic morality. The previous section highlighted themes
regarding moral problems and goods in moral psychology discourse that point to moral values
that may be inherent in research. This section further illuminates potentially inherent values by
discussing the affirmed explanations of the sources of the moral problems and goods that
researchers discuss. Some of these values may be considered epistemic; studying moral behavior
in terms of efficient causal mechanisms seems to be protocol for mainstream psychology.
However, scholars dispute the idea that the most valid knowledge about morality can be
discerned from this perspective (e.g., Slife & Williams, 1995). Nonetheless, researchers seem to
value a mechanistic paradigm to facilitate the formulating of predictions about moral behaviors
that can be tested to derive universal principles. Research not only reveals the valuing of this
paradigm, but it also illuminates what researchers hold as more good, less good, or bad.
First and foremost, researchers describe morality in terms of mechanisms that evolved
because they facilitated survival and reproduction. A mechanistic view allows for interventions
via experimental manipulations to drive different outcomes, which are often viewed as good or
bad. Within the current program of moral psychology, morality is grounded largely in intuitive
and emotional rather than deliberative cognitive processes. While morality itself is rendered
highly manipulable and irrational, moral psychology research is purported to be the voice of
authority concerning value-free facts about moral judgments. Nonetheless, Tybur et al. (2009)
hint that the need to understand the origin of our moral emotional responses stems from the idea
that some “attitudes relating to particular social phenomena” ought to be changed (p. 118)—
some attitudes are superior to others. Implicit moral values related to mechanistic morality in
these articles can be categorized into three themes: 1) The good and bad of evolved morality, 2)
Manipulable morality and immorality, and 3) The better and worse of irrational moral judgments.
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The good and bad of evolved morality. Although not all of these researchers explicitly
ground their theories exclusively in evolutionary principles, none of them suggest a basis for
morality other than its functional role in survival and reproduction, and all their reports are
compatible with the paradigm. Leach et al. (2007) suggest that morality is essential to the group
life of primates such as humans because it helps people “maximize benefits for themselves and
the group as a whole” (p. 236). Maximizing benefits for the self and the group is seen as good.
Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) note that a proscriptive moral system would have been useful in that
“organisms attuned to bad outcomes” would survive better due to “greater consequences of
ignoring harmful, dangerous outcomes than positive outcomes” (p. 524). However, the
researchers suggest that this evolved system is not always optimal; their report manifests
preference for a prescriptive system because it is more discretionary and conducive to
dispositional morality—moral goods that trump the demands of self-monitoring.
Moral motivation, within limits, is also seen as a moral good, and an evolved need for
self-consistency is thought to be “a powerful source” of this commodity (Aquino et al., 2009, p.
124). But Jordan et al. (2011) assert that this need is largely responsible for “the dynamics of
moral behavior” (p. 701) in which striving for self-completeness results in both moral cleansing
(good) and moral licensing (bad). However, when immoral behavior disrupts this balance and
results in cognitive dissonance, it is also thought to cause rationalization that results in more
immoral behavior. Some researchers manifest dismay: “Alarmingly, these dissonance-provoked
changes in attitudes may be durable over time” (Shu et al., 2011, p. 331).
Similarly, Sachdeva et al. (2009) note that while “people’s self-worth is defined to a large
extent by how moral they perceive themselves to be,” immoral behavior can stem from “an
internal balancing of moral self-worth and the cost inherent in altruistic behavior” (p. 523). The
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researchers suggest that immoral behavior, which can be triggered by the environment, may
result in attitudes that license more immoral behavior. People should practice “costly” moral
behaviors until they become automatic, because automatic behaviors may not be as susceptible to
the balancing act that underlies motivations to behave immorally (p. 528).
While natural “self-interest and motivated reasoning” (Lammers et al., 2010, p. 742) are
thought to drive immoral behaviors such as hypocrisy in those who feel a sense of power, the
idea that some behaviors are immoral supposedly began with self-interest and motivated
reasoning in the first place. Schnall et al. (2008) suggest that those mechanisms that evolved to
protect the body from pathogens somehow extended to social and moral domains. While
protecting the body from pathogens may be seen as good, the extension to other domains may be
valued or disvalued according to the specific issue. Horberg et al. (2009) are not indifferent to
the idea that “values originally related to the evolutionary challenges of avoiding . . . toxins” now
influence condemnation of violations within the purity realm (p. 964), which “[constrains] the
pursuit of personal goals” (p. 974). Personal goals, then, are goods that suffer infringement at the
expense of the disvalued extension of another good. Similarly, Hutcherson and Gross (2011)
explain that the moral emotions evolved to reduce risk of exposure to harm, yet at the same time
they increase “prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehumanized minorities” (p. 723). They
argue that when threat from another person is imminent, “vigorous defense or attack can be the
quickest way to resolve the danger, despite the potential risks and energy expenditure” (p. 720).
However, when the threat to self is not direct, “passive avoidance may be a less costly means” of
dealing with it. The researchers argue that moral disgust and contempt serve this purpose—“to
mark individuals whose behavior suggests that they represent a threat and avoid them, thereby
reducing the risk of exposure to harm” (p. 720). Thus, mechanisms explain both protection and
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prejudice. A mechanistic evolutionary account of morality is valued in moral psychology, and
the affirmed effects of the mechanisms are apparently valued and disvalued according to a priori
ideas about what is good and what is bad.
Manipulable morality and immorality. Since a mechanistic view of morality is valued,
researchers study human behavior by adding a mechanistic element to manipulate responses that
are more or less valued. The environment is often implicated as a source of such manipulation,
and experiments are designed to mirror such effects. Aquino et al. (2009) demonstrate through a
series of experimental manipulation a complicated series of events leading to less moral
behavior: “if a situational factor increases the current accessibility of moral identity within the
working self-concept, then it strengthens the motivation to act morally. In contrast, if a
situational factor decreases the current accessibility of moral identity, then it weakens the
motivation to act morally” (p. 123). The researchers measure participants’ centrality of moral
identity and find this measure predicts vulnerability to environmental cues to behave morally or
immorally. The authors worry that environmentally induced immoral behavior may result in high
distress or self-condemnation for those with highly central moral identity, which in turn may
manifest as “elaborate forms of cognitive rationalization” (p. 139).
Shu et al. (2011) are also concerned about cognitive dissonance, in this case due to
“morally permissive” environments that increase cheating and moral disengagement so behavior
is at odds with beliefs (p. 330). Successful manipulations of their research participants show,
“[a]ction, belief, and memory are more susceptible to situational nudges than intuition leads us to
believe” (p. 345). The bad news is that “once people behave dishonestly, they are able to morally
disengage, setting off a downward spiral of future bad behavior” (p. 345). The good news is that
“this slippery slope can be forestalled with simple measures, such as honor codes, that increase
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people’s awareness of ethical standards” (p. 345)—research is designed to show that changing
the environment in certain ways decreases immoral behaviors. Similarly, Feinberg and Willer
(2013) suggest changes to facilitate a moral good; the framing of moral issues influences moral
judgments. In their experimental manipulations, presenting proenvironmental messages from a
moral purity perspective increased support in politically conservative participants.
Not all researchers offer solutions to moral problems, but they demonstrate how
manipulations cause valued or disvalued behaviors. Jordan et al’s (2011) study involves
manipulating the salience of participants’ past moral or immoral behaviors. They find that those
who remember their immoral behaviors cheat less, while those who feel good about their moral
selves cheat more. Thus both moral and immoral behaviors are manipulable, and the researchers
appear to tacitly disvalue cheating. Other reports involving experimental manipulations seem to
imply the disvaluing of severe moral judgments stemming from evolved mechanisms. Lee and
Schwarz (2010) show that inducing cleanliness softens participants’ judgments of others’ moral
misdeeds. Helzer and Pizarro (2011), on the other hand, show that a manipulation mirroring
everyday cleanliness reminders increases the severity of evaluations of sexual behaviors (see also
Zhong et al., 2010). Eskine et al. (2011) find that while disgusting tastes trigger harsh moral
judgments, sweet tastes trigger favorable ones. These researchers seem to value softened and
favorable moral judgments over severe and harsh ones, while disvaluing “an inflated sense of
moral self” (Zhong et al., 2010, p. 860).
However, all researchers do not value all favorable or softened moral judgments.
Feinberg and Willer’s (2013) manipulation included aiming for more stringent moral judgments
against a target who did not recycling a water bottle. Wakslak et al. (2007) make a strong case
for needing not a soft existential guilt but a powerful moral outrage against the unfairness of a
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system that perpetuates inequality. Lammers et al. (2010) advocate breaking “the spiral of
inequality” with direct aggression against the hypocrisy of the powerful in accordance with
findings that manipulating a sense of power increases moral hypocrisy in participants (p. 743).
Finally, Heflick et al. (2011) are also unlikely to value softened moral judgments against the
dehumanization of females.
The better and worse of irrational moral judgments. Moral dilemma studies often include
vignettes involving trade-offs between killing and saving people. Utilitarian judgments
(preserving the most life by whatever means) are sometimes referred to as appropriate, while
deontological judgments (action deemed wrong in any situation) are sometimes referred to as
biased. What people are likely to do in moral dilemmas has real moral implications, and a major
aim of research seems to be to show how judgments are often unreasonable—almost as if this
view of morality itself were valued.
Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) demonstrate that people are often unaware of the
principles guiding their responses. Inability to articulate justification for moral judgments
generally counts as its being unavailable to conscious processes (p. 1087). This helps to explain
the lack of optimal responses in moral judgments. Conway and Gawronski (2013) present
participants with an empathic prime to demonstrate how it increases deontological responding.
They also measure moral identity to show that utilitarian responses reflect a genuine desire to
“maximize welfare” rather than less concern for harm (p. 228). These researchers seem to
disvalue indifference to suffering, but also to value deliberative over purely deontological
processes. Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008) refer to emotional “biases against responding” in
certain ways that cause harm (p. 550), finding that high working-memory-capacity (WMC)
predicts deliberative responses. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) demonstrate how irrelevant cues
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influence moral decisions, adding, “Whether such an influence optimizes or biases the resulting
decision depends on the relevance of the extraneous affective cues to the dilemma at hand” (p.
477, italics added).
A favored way to associate irrationality with morality is through research in disgust.
Tybur et al. (2009) associate moral disgust with phobias and clinical disorders as well as
prejudice. Many of the manipulations cited in the previous section were designed to show how
extraneous cues, such as induced disgust, prime people and influence their moral judgments
(e.g., Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Horberg et al., 2009; Lee & Schwarz, 2010; Schnall et al., 2008;
Zhong et al., 2010). Eskine et al. (2011) wonder if jurors should “avoid overly bitter or sweet
foods as they deliberate a verdict” so as to avoid irrational effects on their judgments (p. 298).
Researchers imply that behaviors such as less cooperation with and more intolerance for
dissimilar others have highly irrational elements. Skitka et al. (2005) differentiate between strong
nonmoral attitudes and strong moral attitudes by associating the latter with cognitive inflexibility,
low integrative complexity in cognition, resistance to counterfactual reasoning, and an irrational
belief in a “collective moral order” (p. 914). All of these implicate moral convictions as being
irrational as well as harmful. While these researchers may not be “chronically intolerant” of
moral convictions (p. 914), they clearly manifest their disvaluing of them.
Gray and Wegner (2009) show how mechanisms guiding inversely related perceptions of
moral agency and patiency (those who act and those who are acted upon) lead to irrational
typecasting. Their research shows how being perceived as a moral agent—good or bad—renders
one likely to receive less help and more harm. Researchers’ emphasis on irrational and irrelevant
triggers may indicate inherent value assumptions about how morality is best understood. Perhaps
tongue-in-cheek, the authors offer “a particularly effective technique” for self-presentation to
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reap the benefits and avoid the costs of this moral typecasting: “casting oneself as a moral patient”
(p. 519).
Conclusion. The themes highlighted above involve moral goods and evils defining the
way people ought and ought not to be—moral values. Researchers may also hold views on how
people ought to prioritize these moral goods—moral values again. Moreover, it seems unlikely
they can be expunged from a research program in which the researchers value them. Inasmuch as
research focuses on such concerns, the potential for value involvement in moral psychology—
even central to a research program—seems high.
Discussion
These analyses highlight a conflict between two important ideas: 1) Moral psychology
operates according to a value-free ideal, revealing knowledge about human moral behaviors and
judgments more valid and objective than other types of knowledge, and 2) Values are inherent in
and inextricable from moral psychology’s research findings. While value-free science is valued
for providing “a relatively fair and unbiased means of mapping the world,” scholars have
theoretically unraveled the possibility of value-free knowledge and have noted problems
associated with the value-free ideal (Slife et al., 2012, p. 737).
In this project I asked, “What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to
what humans should be like?” Both content analysis and cultural discourse analysis point to a
pervasive distribution of such ideas. Every article suggests—if only implicitly—a moral problem
or a moral good, a notion of what is naturally harmful to humans, a notion of what a better world
would look like, and an obligation for psychologists to help toward that end. My second question,
“Does moral psychology promote values as if they were objective and value free?” is also
illuminated by both analyses. Every article manifests ontological dualism by asserting objectivity
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assumed to be separable from the subjective realm inhabited by regular human thought, the value
of minimizing subjectivity through method, and a notion presented as value-free fact of what
humans are naturally like. If these researchers assume an objective realm accessible by method
that reveals to them a universal human nature including what is good and bad for humans, moral
values would seem to be inherently involved while at the same time being refuted by adherence
to the value-free ideal.
The extent to which values influence research outcomes cannot be ascertained here, but
the value-free ideal seems to have no threatening contenders. These are not epistemic values, yet
they seem to be inherent and inevitably influential at the heart of research, in that some position
must be taken about how best to understand morality and what humans should be like. These
values appear to guide the creation of items for research measures, scientific boundaries and
associations placed between categories, the tone and emphases of research reports, as well as
researcher suggestions for alleviating moral problems. As noted previously, the implications of
value ladenness in moral psychology may be viewed as a microcosm of those in the wider
discipline of psychology where ideas about what is good and bad for humans are part and parcel
to research and practice. Whether value influence is responsible or biased depends on the issue—
and the point of view. While values may seem a “serious threat” to science (see Eichmann 2008,
p. 11), they may also serve to make science valid (e.g., Nozick, 1998; Douglas, 2007), socially
relevant (Root, 2007), adequately informative to consumers (Slife et al., 2012), and socially
responsible (Teo, 2015). As born out by the research reports of this investigation, values guide
researchers to help solve human problems.
On the other hand, values may stimulate human problems as great as those they solve
(e.g., Bohm, 2002, p. 2) or the marginalization of designated groups (Teo, 2015). Value-free

51
idealism may hinder scientific objectivity by restraining consideration of important perspectives
(Wylie and Nelson, 2007), and suppression resulting in obscuring them. This analysis highlights
where researchers’ varying conceptions of honesty and morality may influence moral
psychology’s findings, and without examination of those values, unpopular perspectives are
indeed likely to be ignored. As cultures are at least partly responsible for the meanings of
honesty and morality (see Isotalus, 2009), it would seem that morally contested definitions of
honesty and morality are widespread and may be conceptualized according to culturally defined
epistemic values with consequential implications. In Machiavellian terms, taking advantage of
the poor may not reflect dishonesty but pragmatism. According to economic theory, the intuition
that “sexual abuse of children inflicts deep psychological harm” may “reflect an irrational taboo
about the sexuality of children” (Posner, 1992, p. 396). Given many versions of dishonesty and
morality and many epistemological paradigms, I would argue that adhering to a value-free ideal
in moral psychology not only is a kind of deception hindering consumers of its knowledge from
requisite evaluation, but also leaves the field vulnerable to a sort of tunnel vision aimed at
popular ideologies.
Whether one frames values as “biases” depends on one’s point of view, but to overlook
them is to neglect responsibility to researchers and consumers alike. While many values would
seem to be inappropriate for scientific research even in a value-disclosure culture, a value-free
ideal is likely to hide rather than expunge them. My major concern in publishing this report is
that moral psychologists would respond by redoubling their efforts to obscure their values in
disinterested language, making it even more difficult to discern the assumptions behind their
research. It is fairer to consumers to reveal inappropriate values than to hide them behind a cloak
of disinterested terms.
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Science is different from other ways of knowing and is invaluable in understanding the
world and how to reach human goals, yet a value-free ideal in psychology may be detrimental to
society. Considerable efforts toward expunging biases are routine, yet biases continue to be seen
as problematic in research (e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Pashler & Harris, 2012).
Attempting to balance political or other views, as Duarte et al. (2015) suggest, may be helpful,
but this neither removes values from research nor directly promotes requisite examination of
values. Further, presenting moral psychology’s knowledge as value free when it is laden with
moral values exacerbates potential problems, positioning researchers much as “high priests” of
moral psychology (see Plantinga, 2011, p. 307). For these reasons, I argue that the value-free
ideal should be replaced with value disclosure in psychology. In the next section I discuss some
limitations of the current study and offer suggestions in this vein from scholars’ theoretical work
on values in psychology.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present analyses. As is the case with any research, the methods and analyses of my
project are inherently biased and interpreted. In being aware of my own biases, however, I am
able to pay attention to them. The addition of alternate codes in the codebook was helpful in
providing a contrast for each code and revealing coder discrepancies (see Table 5). Additionally,
I tried to incorporate into my analyses the idea of radical openness, or surprisability, elements of
which are discussed further below (Slife, Johnson, & Jennings, 2015).
The second coder coded 20% of the data, and multiple coders covering a higher
percentage of data would show a broader perspective on the level of interrater reliability. There
is no limit to how many texts may have been included in the analysis, and anomalous views in
moral psychology may have been missed because of the current cut-off of 25 articles. Some
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discrepancies between coders were likely due to the need for codebook clarification. It would be
helpful to develop this codebook further to be useful in future value investigations.
A culture of value disclosure. Research cannot be both laden with inherent moral
values and value free, but this does not relegate moral psychology or psychology in general to a
state of “anything goes” relativism. This false dichotomy has been soundly refuted by
theoreticians, many who have offered alternate approaches to dealing with values inherent in
disciplinary work.
In light of serious implications that the value-free ideal in moral psychology is problematic,
particularly that a prevalent value-free ideal sustains the potential for deception, intentional or
unwitting, I advocate value disclosure as a serious and continuing effort. Value disclosure does
not exhaust approaches for dealing with inherent values in moral psychology, but I submit that a
culture of value disclosure should replace the culture of value-free idealism. Psychologists are
obligated to pay attention to the dissemination of knowledge and take responsibility for
effectively informing consumers (see Dupré, 2001). Routine disclaimers and cautions may not be
enough to stem the tide of misinformation once in the hands of purveyors of moral psychology’s
knowledge.
If researchers must begin with assumptions and values, they need guidelines for
managing the values inherent in their research. Much work needs to be done concerning how to
systematize the disclosure of values to encourage researchers to attend to rather than hide or
attempt to bracket their values. If value disclosure is user unfriendly, it will not adequately fulfill
its function. Efforts have been made, often in disciplines other than psychology, to deal with
values in ways that involve value disclosure instead of adherence to the value-free ideal (e.g.,
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Yanchar, 2016). Theoretical psychologists offer conceptualizations of these efforts that may
benefit psychology. These are discussed below as three things that researchers should do:
1) Attend to and acknowledge assumptions, including epistemic ones
2) Adequately define and contextualize terms with important alternate meanings
3) Increase the depth and breadth of critical thinking, including surprisability
Assumptions. Assumptions reflect values with important implications often ignored in
reports (Slife & Williams, 1995), such as assumptions about what it means to be “human”
(Williams, 2002). A particularly pervasive value assumption in this investigation is the view that
humans are fundamentally mechanistic with no genuine agency—not a neutral position, but an
assumption with implications important to research method and critical to interpretation of
findings. Researchers need to own and acknowledge their own position on this issue and
consider alternatives, informing consumers so they are better able to evaluate findings.
For example, when Shu et al. (2011) suggest that their studies demonstrate that
dishonesty leads to self-justification, which leads to moral disengagement and further dishonesty,
they should acknowledge their position either that this is an efficient causal chain that humans
are locked into until an intervention is applied from outside the system or that this is a human
tendency at least in the context of the studies themselves. The difference may seem trivial, but
the implications of requiring an applied intervention are quite different from those of genuine
contextual agency. In the first, people implementing a moral code intervention would expect that
with continued adjustments, dishonesty could be eliminated (see p. 344), whereas in the second,
the effectiveness of any intervention would be viewed as subject to rupture.
Defining meanings. When psychologists draw empirically-derived boundaries around
such categories as “harm” and “fairness” as if they are objective and universal, they ignore the
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value-ladenness of such meanings and fail to recognize different contextual meanings people
hold for these terms. Though researchers reveal in part their values by what they include in and
exclude from measures, methods, and interpretations, they fail to provide clear definitions for
consumers. The value of tolerance may be apparent without researchers’ acknowledging it as a
value, but the consumer is left to ask, “Tolerance of what?” If such terms are part of a scientific
research program, researchers need to own and clearly state these meanings. An adequate
understanding of one’s own meanings may involve considering alternate meanings and their
implications as well as different meanings for different contexts, and this should be reflected in
the definitions of terms.
In Graham et al. (2009), terms such as “harm” and “justice” abound. Meanings may be
somewhat accessible through close inspection of research measures and other clues throughout
the research report, but clear definitions from which to interpret the researchers’ claims are
lacking. For example, “harm” is likely to have contested meanings, and this report would be
much clearer to consumers if researchers considered alternate meanings and included the
researchers’ definitions with examples of what counts and what does not count as harm within
specific contexts.
Critical thinking and surprisability. Yanchar, Slife, and Warne (2008) provide
suggestions for a “perspectival, relational, and interpretive” approach for dealing with values that
has potential to increase the depth and breadth of critical thinking so essential to disciplinary
progress (p. 265). They view science as a human knowledge-gathering endeavor that requires
ongoing critical dialogue that includes compassion, sympathy, and respect for other views and in
which guidelines and methods are established as tentative rather than permanent fixtures. Such
an approach clears a space for effortful surprisability, a kind of openness that may help
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researchers to broaden the scope of their understanding (Slife et al., 2015). Components of
surprisability include awareness of one’s own assumptions, softening of those assumptions in
recognizing that other interpretations may be informative, considering alternatives, and paying
attention to particularity. With these researchers, I submit that value disclosure reflecting such
critical reasoning should be a hallmark of science.
In Skitka et al. (2005), the researchers suggest that moral convictions are components of
justification for intolerance and horrific violence. While their report discloses important
researcher values rather than obscuring them as so many reports do, it could benefit substantially
by using the critical approach advocated by Yanchar et al. (2008). The report aims to show how
moral convictions are irrational and engender serious societal ills, but a studied effort involving
respect for alternative views could reveal perspectival and contextual information critical to an
understanding of moral convictions.
Conclusion
As Duarte et al. (2015) suggest, efforts to diversify views within moral psychology would
help to avoid marginalization of some alternate values. But researchers also need to disclose their
values through a critical approach to their own assumptions and meanings, maintaining scientific
validity without obscuring values behind a value-free ideal. If presupposed values are inevitable
in psychological science while the value-free ideal is championed, implicit values are not likely
to be examined, and they may be obscured without awareness. Failure to examine them could
amount to avoiding disciplinary responsibility; psychologists could avoid consideration of
important values that should guide disciplinary practices as well as values that limit science and
impose dominant views on others. The moral values needed to guide disciplinary practices could
easily give way to other less important implicit values, with psychological science imposing its
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value-laden knowledge as value-free on an unwitting public. I have attempted to approach this
responsibility through examining inherent values in moral psychology.
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TABLE A2 - CODEBOOK OF IMPLICIT VALUES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Interrater
reliability (K)*

I. Value-free science - What values do moral psychologists manifest regarding how best to obtain subdisciplinary knowledge?
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria

1 OBSERVABLE (OBSERVABLE EVENTS)
To make research less subjective, researchers study complex nonobservable phenomena by narrowly framing accessible operational definitions that stand in for
them.
Researchers try to remove subjectivity by concisely defining in accessible observational terms what counts as a phenomenon. These narrow operational
definitions prescribe in limited terms what counts as evidence. Though almost anything used to systematize a study may be an operational definition, this code
refers to those that are simplified to impoverished meanings.
Impoverished qualitative or quantitative measures taken as valid stand-ins for complex phenomena; questions on measures that stand in for complex
phenomena; numbers named in the same passage as the constructs they stand in for (other appearances of such numbers belong only in quantitative); models
standing in for complex phenomena; neuro-images standing in as valid evidence for non-observable experience; exclusion or marginalization of the subjectivity
involved in more meaningful representations of phenomena; implying that narrowly-defined data are less subjective

Key terms

Measure, instrument, self-report, Likert scale, model

Related codes
Exclusion criteria

Method Driven, Quantitative, Universal, Dualism, Prediction
Passages in which the observable item (measure, model, etc.) are not included; reports of statistical procedures not stating direct association with
nonobservables; observational data retaining qualities of importance; narrow observables not taken to be les subjective than other ways of knowing
“The core premise of the present research is that moral judgment is inadequate in accounting for moral action and that personality variables may go a
considerable way toward bridging that gap” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 845).
“[D]ifferences between exemplars in agentic aspects were not revealed, despite such intimations in people’s conceptions of bravery” (Walker & Frimer, 2007,
pp. 857-8). (they were not found because the specified observation didn’t show up)
1a NONOBSERVABLE (NONOBSERVABLE MEANINGS)
Researchers study nonobservable phenomena using systematic approaches emphasizing important meanings over value freedom.

Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

Researchers recognize that nonobservables, though difficult to study and even more difficult to make accessible to others, lose important qualities if they are
transformed into narrowly defined observables. Researchers use whatever methods work to get at those important qualities and truths, manifesting the belief
that truth depends on meanings, subjectivity cannot be expunged, and attempting to expunge it results in misrepresentation of truth.
Observable data about nonobservable phenomena (e.g., transcripts) that are kept as close as possible to what is studied (direct interviews of people’s
experiences), not narrowly or pre-defined, and not assumed to be the unobservable phenomenon in question (e.g., certain responses do not equal depression,
though they mean something). Instead, researchers provide justifications for why they think a certain meaning is being conveyed in this data.
Qualitative data when they are transformed into narrowly defined observables (including numbers) whose association with nonobservable meanings are
tenuous or thin; the emphasis being on the thin observables themselves where important meanings seem to be lost; meaningful data that are unimportant
because they are too ambiguous
“life stories of caring exemplars were considerably more optimistic and positive in affective tone than those of brave exemplars” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 858).
“[I]t cannot be determined from these data whether such recollections represent actual experiences or construals in light of present understandings, but it is
revelatory that there were clear intimations of early advantage” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 857). (researchers consider this useful information—though not
evidence—in spite of subjectivity)
2 QUANTITATIVE (QUANTITATIVE DATA)
Data are transformed into numbers and run through statistical tests to obtain numerical outcomes thought to be less subjective than qualitative data.

0.6548
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If numbers seem to be more value free than the phenomena they represent, aggregating those numbers into measures of central tendency and applying statistical
procedures designed to minimize bias make the results appear even more value free. .05 means .05 in any language. Thus patterns of quantities are more important
than meanings. “[W]hen all subjectivity has been subtracted from the world . . .the really real world remains. And what remains that is really real is the world of

0.2494

Inclusion criteria

quanta. Think of quanta as all the things that are what they are . . . from . . . no point of view” (Shweder, 1996, p. 177).
First ask, are the numbers used with the intention of making research appear more value free (as in discussions of a study’s verified correlational findings)?
Second, do the numbers (especially those resulting from analyses) count more than the meanings they represent? Explicit references to statistical analyses,
Likert & other numerical measures, and interrater reliability checks count here.

Key terms

Measure (quantitative), significant, instrument, analysis, reliable, correlation, regression, association (when it refers to a correlational finding in the study—also
look for numbers)

Related codes
Exclusion criteria

Method Driven, Universal, Dualism, Observable, Prediction
If a measure is mentioned and there is reason to believe it may not be quantitative, do not code it. Also excluded: numbers used where they do not replace nonnumerical meanings; unless there’s a compelling reason, numbers describing participant information
“These analyses revealed highly significant differences between the brave and caring exemplars on three personality variables” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 855).
2a QUALITATIVE (QUALITATIVE DATA)
Data are systematically studied in terms of requisite qualitative subjective meanings thought to be more valid than numbers by themselves.

Typical exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria

Researchers focus more on the meanings of unobservable phenomena (which involves analyzing what they mean to persons) than on counting and computing
observables associated with it (which limit meanings). Meanings may be worth analyzing without limiting them to forms that can be counted and computed.
Even to a researcher, .05 is only meaningful insomuch as there are meanings associated with it, so computations of associated numbers cannot bring data
outside the realm of human subjectivity. From this view, “the objective conception of the real world is partial or incomplete” (Shweder, 1996, p. 178).
Research emphasis on quality rather than quantity and statistical analysis; numerical representations viewed as inadequate without qualitative meanings;
passages of discussion section that emphasize the qualities rather than quantities of the qualitative data
Indications that qualitative data are less valid because of their subjectivity; qualitative data transformed into numbers with the implication that such
transformation puts the data outside the realm of human subjectivity
“life stories of caring exemplars were considerably more optimistic and positive in affective tone than those of brave exemplars” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 858).
3 DUALISM (ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM)
Researchers treat subjectivity as separable from “facts,” avoiding or marginalizing what they consider subjective.

N/A
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Researchers aim for knowledge free of subjective influences (e.g., cultural views), assuming dual dimensions of knowledge. Researchers explicate efforts to
remove biases (e.g., beliefs, opinions, intuitions introspections), and references to evidence and validity imply that objective (value-free) methods lead to
objective (value-free) data. They imply dualism by emphasizing value-free methods that must be followed to obtain value-free data, hoping to avoid saying how
things should be in human morality (e.g., being influenced by philosophical positions), but rather how things are (e.g., how they function).
Any concession to the value-free idea: Statements or implications of fact/value distinctions; usually efforts to expunge viewpoints and biases; preference given
to methods thought to expunge subjectivity; marginalization of information due to its being value laden or subjective
Significance, reliability, control, blind, random assignment, construal, notion, beliefs, values, self-report, bias, prejudice, suggest, support, show, demonstrate,
resolve, reveal, evidence, valid, function

Related codes
Exclusion criteria

Universal, Method Driven, Prediction, Quantitative, Observable
If it is Universal, it might not be dualistic if there is no apparent implication that only value-free methods and information are involved in making a statement—
for example, introductory material often includes philosophical discussions that imply universality but not dualism. Endorsements of multiple viewpoints and
balanced representations of values not endorsing the value-free ideal; instances in which researchers explicate their biases and priorities, even if they attempt to
reduce certain types of biases

Example
rationale
Typical exemplar
Atypical

Universal (but NOT Dualism) – In this passage ideas are stated as universals, but there is no reference to value-free methods to obtain value-free knowledge; it is
not clear that value freedom is implied.
“these analyses revealed pronounced differences between moral exemplars . . . and ordinary individuals” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 854).
“it cannot be determined from these data whether such recollections represent actual experiences or construals in light of present understandings, but it is
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Key terms

exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria

revelatory that there were clear intimations of early advantage” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 857). (in context it is apparent the researchers believe other data to
“determine” such things)
3a HOLISM (ONTOLOGICAL HOLISM)
Researchers treat subjectivity as inherent in all human “facts,” observations, and understandings; understanding truth requires understanding context.
Researchers manifest belief that subjectivity is inherent in all human knowledge about the world, so efforts to rein in biases should be particular to the aims of
research (and explicated as such). Value ladenness may be seen as a good thing, such as when human rights are valued. Whereas no research has ever been
shown to not begin with philosophical positions, researchers attempt to examine their own inherent biases and explicate them. Rather than referring to “facts,”
they may refer to contextual objectivity and truth, which is not an endorsement of “anything goes” but an attempt to locate truth in its context. “[T]here is no
place else, no neutral place, for us to stand” (Shweder, 1991, p. 23).
Explication of inherent biases; indications that findings are interpreted and not definitive (though still useful); explications of contextual reality
Implying the aim to expunge subjectivity in general; including “subjective” information but casting it as less valid; hints that values “creep in” and should be kept
out; endorsement of the value-free ideal (In order to be assigned this code, a passage would have to explicitly say that biases are inherent and that the
researchers are aiming to prevent only certain things from influencing outcomes).
4 METHOD DRIVEN (METHOD-DRIVEN SCIENCE)
Researchers use and explicate their methods with the implication that these render their evaluations of human moral phenomena value free.
Researchers purport to evaluate human moral phenomena from a value-free perspective. Though any research design will depend somewhat on the topic at
hand and most will be constrained at some level by method, this code refers to methods considered to be givens, tried and accepted by the scientific
community, that facilitate value free results. Qualitative studies are not automatically topic-driven.
Using a priori established methods to facilitate value-free results: True experiments supposed to establish cause and effect, “blind” studies supposed to keep
biases from creeping in, control group, checks to measure construct and other types of validity, interrater reliability, random assignment, replication, measures
of significance (p-values), etc.; attempting to correct improper method by using more appropriate established methods; indications that researchers believe
their methods to eliminate subjectivity; criticism claiming that studies are biased because they do not employ “correct” procedures aimed at expunging
subjectivity; justifications that appeal to value free-methods or value-free data; making an appeal to “good model fit” or other coefficients to justify claims about
phenomena; claims that methods worked to show or resolve anything (even very small things); emphasis on predictive power; use of a model of a phenomenon
and research based on prediction counts as method-driven

Key terms

Significance, reliable, valid, reveal, predict, analysis, blind, random, control, model fit, replicate, function

Other likely
codes
Exclusion criteria

Dualism, Universal, Quantitative, Prediction, Observable, (anything Method-Driven is probably dualistic as well)

Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
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Passages where research is cited as “showing” knowledge where the methodism of those studies is unclear; employing some of the above methods for the
explicit purpose of a more fair representation (intersubjective agreement) rather than an implication of value freedom; other methods being used and not
automatically considered more subjective than these traditional methods; studies in which subjectivity & biases are assumed to be inherent (and are explicated);
controls and checks assumed to limit specific biases but not with the idea that all biases should be eliminated.
“these analyses revealed pronounced differences between moral exemplars . . . and ordinary individuals” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 854).
“With an aggregated . . . conception of people’s attitudes, . . . the TPB can predict individual intention and behavior with accuracies of 80-90%” (Kaiser, 2006, p.
80).
4a TOPIC DRIVEN (TOPIC-DRIVEN METHOD)
Researchers emphasize how the approach they use facilitates obtaining the particular knowledge they seek and de-emphasize value-free knowledge.
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Method is used in service of getting at important truths about a phenomenon that are not necessarily “facts.” A strong case is made for using a particular
method to get at a particular phenomenon without emphasizing value freedom. If researchers focus on an approved set of methods for finding “factual” or
universal knowledge, this code is probably not going to apply—there may rarely be a section that heavily emphasizes a topic-driven approach. Topic-driven
method includes explicating justifications for methods that acknowledge salient researcher values as well as the kinds of biases researchers attempt to avoid—
the concern is not value freedom but getting at truth, which may not be universal. Qualitative methods do not automatically fit this description.

Inclusion criteria

Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria

Studies in which method is not set in stone from the outset but adjusted even down to basic assumptions according to the needs of the topic; studies not
limiting methods to those thought to facilitate value-free knowledge; findings explicitly acknowledged as interpreted and value laden; strong case made for using
a particular method because it gets at the phenomenon of interest rather than because it facilitates value-free knowledge. In rare cases, a topic-driven approach
may be heavily emphasized in one section of an otherwise method-driven article.
Studies in which dualistic methodology (aiming for value freedom) upstages consideration of method
“They were . . . asked . . . to . . . convey the event’s impact and what it says about who they are as persons” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 849).
5 PREDICTION (UNDERSTANDING BY PREDICTION)
Researchers manifest the belief that understanding truth inherently involves prediction.
Prediction is valued because it is supposed to demonstrate valid truth free of viewpoints. Researchers manifest the hope that their studies will be predictive (and
replicable). Knowledge not likely to have predictive value is not considered useful.
Research must exclude the unpredictable (e.g., genuine agency)
Passage should also include one or more of these: Research emphasis on hypothesis testing and prediction, especially when claiming that the data support
universal principles; suggestions that not predicting is a problem (no discovery of any universal principles); passages that suggest prediction as an aim or an
accomplishment

Key terms

Predict, account for, should, explain, test, contribution

Other likely
codes
Exclusion criteria

Universal, Method Driven, Dualism, Observable, Quantitative, Mechanistic

Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria

0.2312

Interpretations of predictions that claim no more than general tendencies in populations and emphasize understanding over prediction; research questions not
necessarily associated with prediction
“it is hypothesized that exemplars will score higher than comparison participants” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 847).
“it contributed nothing to the prediction of moral action” (Walker & Frimer, p. 852).
5a UNDERSTANDING (UNDERSTANDING INDEPENDENT OF PREDICTION)
Researchers emphasize understanding and manifest the belief that understanding without concern for prediction may be a better approach to getting at truth.
Though researchers recognize prediction’s usefulness, they also recognize that the truth about human behaviors may not be entirely predictable. They study
human behavior first because they want to understand it and devise methods with this in mind. They may find general tendencies in behaviors that support
prediction, but this is not the emphasis of studies. When deciding which of these codes to apply, emphasis and context matter. There must be some indication
that at least some of the time prediction is not the most important thing. “Unless we already know a good deal about a person’s goals, preferences, beliefs,
ethics, and cultural meanings, most of our ‘universal’ generalizations have little predictive power” (Shweder, 1991, p. 270).
Efforts to understand that do not involve prediction; manifestations that absolute prediction is not attainable where agents are involved; passages where it is
apparent that some data are important in their own right for helping researchers to understand phenomena
Admissions of lack of prediction that imply more research is needed to adequately predict; studies in which “understanding” inherently means being able to
predict
6 UNIVERSAL (UNIVERSALITY)
Explanations about behavior and behavioral research are cast in terms of context-free principles that do not change.
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Researchers aim to produce universals that are reliable across contexts, obviously free of subjectivity. Even if they are refined to a detailed level, statements in
reports manifest the aim to discover universal principles that predict and do not change. The more generally a principle can be shown to apply, the more valued
it is. Acknowledged limitations and calls for more research to discover specific criteria imply the aim to produce more refined and universal statements. When
authors speak of theories, almost always they are speaking in terms of universality.
Implications that findings or phenomena should always be the case across contexts (detailed variables can be known and should always produce the same
result); indications of efforts toward universal applications of principles; seeking universal and unchanging answers; implications that theories apply universally
and should be refined until they reflect universal principles. Look for passages in which the researchers make present-tense global statements about the way

0.0694

things are. If it implies that the best explanation ultimately ends in natural selection, it implies Universality.
Key terms

If results suggest, demonstrate, reveal, show, or the researchers find valid evidence, it is probably an implication of universality

Other likely
codes
Exclusion criteria

If it implies Natural Rationality or Natural Types, it implies Universality. If it is coded with Dualism or Methodism, it is usually but not always also Universal.
Predictions are usually meant universally.
Some passages may be excluded from this code because apparently the researchers are only referring to what happened in one case, even if they make universal
statements elsewhere. There also may be interpretations that make allowance for particular differences and contexts that do not depend on universal principles.
“we present a multifaceted view of national identification and test the hypothesis that different modes of identification have opposing relations to feelings of
group-based guilt” (Roccas, Klar, & Leviatan, 2006, p. 698).
6a CONTEXTUAL (CONTEXTUALITY)
Explanations about behavior are cast in terms of particular contexts that may not recur.

Typical exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

While phenomena exclusive to particular contexts do not lend themselves to establishing reliability, researchers study them with the belief that both may be
important sources of truth. Though such truth may be useful in understanding other contexts, it is not considered to be reducible to unchanging principles.
“Unless we already know a good deal about a person’s goals, preferences, beliefs, ethics, and cultural meanings, most of our ‘universal’ generalizations have
little predictive power” (Shweder, 1991, p.270).
Inclusion criteria
Emphasis on particular contexts that may never recur; Interpretations that make allowance for particular differences and contexts that do not depend on
universal principles; questioning the existence or prevalence of universals
Exclusion criteria Implications that explanations including contextual details should be similar in similar contexts; Explications of limitations that imply more details are needed to
establish universal principles
II. Understanding morality – What values do moral psychologists manifest regarding how best to conceptualize morality?
Mnemonic
MECHANISM (MECHANISTIC MORALITY)
Short
Human morality is best understood in mechanistic rather than meaningful terms.
description
Detailed
Morality is discussed in terms of the mechanisms underlying it (parts that interact like gears) to the exclusion of true possibilities. Researchers appear to believe
description
that moral cognitions and behaviors have been explained when the underlying causal mechanisms have been explained. “[Q]uite fantastically and against much
evidence, it is conveniently assumed that we can physically enter a transcendent realm where the effects of context, content, and meaning can be eliminated,
standardized, or kept under control, and the central processor observed in the raw” (Shweder, 1991, p. 81).
Inclusion criteria
Explanations of moral phenomena in terms of mechanisms that cause them; mention of components of phenomena treated as discrete units that must be
triggered, shut down, etc.; indications that explanations require explication of mechanisms responsible for phenomena; statements that attribute human
morality to mechanism
Key terms

Dynamics, process, mechanism, function, experiment, trigger, prime, cue, drive, manipulation

Related codes
Exclusion criteria

Natural Rationality, Universal, Dualism, Prediction, Method Driven
Passages that do not mention multiple components or use mechanistic terms; influences of biology and environment construed holistically and not as discrete
causal entities

Example
rationale
Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short

Researchers make room in this passage for the possibility of meaning that is not elsewhere in the article ultimately reduced to mechanisms.
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“several possible mediating mechanisms . . . explain how intensification of the conflict causes a decrease in group-based guilt” (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 705).
“Glorification suppressed the attachment effect, but not vice versa” (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 698).
N/A
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7a MEANING (MEANINGFUL MORALITY)
Human morality is best understood in terms of contextual and intentional meanings that are not reducible to mechanisms.

description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria
Example
rationale
Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

Inclusion criteria

Researchers manifest the belief that the meanings of intentional moral behaviors and the constraints of biology and environment on them are not reducible to
mechanisms—that trying to reduce them in this way results in distortions and misrepresentations of the truth. Understanding human meanings within contexts
is necessary for understanding human moral behaviors.
Explanations that cast morality in ultimately and genuinely meaningful terms, using “mechanistic” words only metaphorically; explanations that consider context
as essential for understanding components of moral meanings and do not reduce them to mechanisms
Researchers make room in this passage for the possibility of meaning that is not elsewhere in the article ultimately reduced to mechanisms.
Explanations that use meaningful terms that ultimately imply non-meaningful mechanisms that cause phenomena associated with morality; components of
phenomena treated as discrete units that must be triggered, shut down, etc. and whose synthesis can add up to the phenomena themselves
“a dynamic self-narrative better reflects how individuals work out a sense of identity and fashion a meaningful place in the psychosocial world” (Walker &
Frimer, 2007, p. 856). (the authors are unclear as to whether or not such “work[ing] out” is reducible to mechanisms, so the possibility of meaningful morality
exists here)
8 NATURAL TYPES (REIFIED NATURAL BOUNDARIES)
Human morality is best understood in terms of types that occur naturally.
Researchers specify valued classifications associated with human morality and the universal boundaries between different types as if they were “out there, fixed
in reality, waiting to be discovered by means of . . . correlational analysis” (Shweder, 1991, p. 184). This naturalness is reified by factor analyses and in other
ways, such as when many researchers study the same “types”, confirming that they are valid natural distinctions rather than evidence of the values of
researchers and their cultures. Even if researchers aver that such types vary by culture, they use value-free methods to show us which types people value, in
essence, reifying them as universal.
The following are included (but not if the researchers explicitly state that the findings only reflect what is important to specific people): Efforts to demonstrate
the natural boundaries between two or more constructs; distinctions that imply universality or scientificity of boundaries; indicating the necessity of establishing
such universality or clarity of boundaries; factor and other analyses used to show categories are valid; citing a history of research confirming valid distinctions (or
those needing refinement); causal theories cast in terms of such “natural” distinctions; suggestions that “good model fit” and other results support the
distinctions; appeal to cross-cultural studies that further support such distinctions; attributions of distinct types to predisposition by underlying biological
substrates. Even if researchers within an article indicate that the types they are studying are culturally defined and there are other ways to approach them, they
may still present findings as if they support a natural delineation.

Key terms

Factor, analysis, distinct, model, significant, discrete, differ

Related codes
Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

Universal, Method Driven, Dualism, Quantitative, Prediction, Observable
Emphasizing that boundaries are delineated intentionally and according to cultural values
“These analyses revealed highly significant differences between the brave and caring exemplars on three personality variables” (Walker & Frimer, 2007, p. 855).
8a INTENTIONAL TYPES (INTENTIONALLY PURPOSED BOUNDARIES)
Boundaries delineating “types” are treated as existing because they play a part in genuine human purposes (what genuinely matters to humans).
Researchers manifest recognition that since differences in phenomena associated with human behavior are innumerable and could be construed in innumerable
ways, boundaries placed to delineate “types” are purposeful rather than universal, revealing what is important and valued subjectively, including the subjectivity
inherent in the knowledge-seeking culture of people that study natural differences. Specific questions used in measures that are later analyzed reflect what is
important.
Indications that boundaries are delineated intentionally and according to cultural values
Researcher classifications that give lip service to intentionality but in context do not make plain the importance of the cultural and value basis of the boundaries
9 NATURAL RATIONALITY
Human morality is assumed to be based in natural (universal) individual cognitive and emotive processes.

0.4108
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Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Mnemonic
Short
description

0.1794

Detailed
description

Inclusion criteria

Researchers explain all human behavior in terms of exclusively natural (universally governed) rationality, usually in terms of ultimate individual self-interest.
Natural rationality is often ultimately directly correlated with utility, or improved likelihood of survival and reproduction for an individual (or the individual’s
group, which is ultimately in service of the individual); hence, it is ultimately economic and self-interested. “Rationality is . . . a presupposition . . .. We assume
that behavior is rational and then use the concept of rationality as a criterion to decide how much we need to know in advance of our explanations. . . . For
example, . . . With respect to what can phobic, compulsive, and hysterical behavior be seen as rational” (Shweder, 1991, p. 296-7)?
Implications that universal principles (usually based in ultimate self-interest) govern moral cognition, reason, and rationality, and their development in
individuals; assumptions that morality is best understood in terms of discrete individual rationality as it is influenced by the environment; explanations of what
helps or hinders good outcomes of natural rationality; statements implying clear distinctions between emotive/intuitive and rational processes; implications that
one behavior or way of thinking is more naturally rational than others; indications that people should be rational (implying the naturalness of rationality).

Key terms

Process, dynamics, self, adapt, rational, utility, construal, appraisal, motivation, individual, self-interest, function, self-consistency, cognition, reason, emotive

Related codes
Exclusion criteria

Universal, Mechanistic Morality, Better World, Natural Harm
Passages that may imply but do not mention such things as cognition, rationality, or reasoning and do not directly imply them; statements that imply cultural
meanings of rationality; implication that cognition is not governed by universal principles
“This makes people who are strongly attached to their in-group particularly vulnerable to feeling morally responsible and distressed when exposed to possibly
incriminating information on the group’s infractions” (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 700).
“several possible mediating mechanisms . . . explain how intensification of the conflict causes a decrease in group-based guilt” (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 705).

Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description

9a SITUATED RATIONALITY
“Rational” thinking and behavior in humans is considered to be inextricable from culture (broadly defined) and genuine meaning.

Researchers believe the boundaries defining rationality are fluid and fuzzy and depend on situatedness as true agents both constrained and enabled by biology
and culture—and that this does not boil down exclusively to natural selection. Thinking and behavior, though perhaps universal in some respects, is thought to
be inextricable from culture (broadly defined). Researchers are open to many types of rationality and fuzzy boundaries around definitions of rational, emotive,
and intuitive, which are not necessarily exclusive of one another.
Inclusion criteria
Indications that rationality is cultural, intuitive, emotive, and agentic; suggestions that what is termed pre-logical thought may in some cases be better than what
is called rational thought; suggestions that what is considered universal natural rationality may not tell the whole story
Exclusion criteria Indications that intuitive processes are always present but that rationality (construed as natural and not cultural) is superior, leading to better outcomes;
implications that rational thought is superior to intuition. If authors do not suggest that genuine agency is part of the situationality, do not use this code.
III. Good & bad – What values do moral psychologists manifest regarding how people should and should not be?
Mnemonic
10 HARM (NATURAL HARM)
Short
Researchers’ values concerning what is harmful and not harmful to humans inform their conceptualization of morality.
description
Detailed
Researchers implicitly assume the boundaries they assign to “harm” (or what is bad for humans) to be naturally and universally important. These assumptions
description
are often related to ideas about morality. Boundaries include some types of physiological, psychological, and economic impairment associated with terms such
as justice, well-being, rights, and protection. Researchers may not define or use the term “harm,” but still imply a natural definition. These boundaries also
exclude items that are not thought to be harmful. Though researchers may suggest that different cultures have different subjective meanings of harm and not
harm, researchers’ ideas of harm and not harm are not thought of as subjective.
Discussions that include the idea of moral violations or anything that should cause guilt because of its causing harm to someone; harm used as a natural category or
Inclusion criteria
construct; discussions that imply something universally or objectively harmful or bad for humans; implications that humans should not do certain things
considered harmful; implications that some things should naturally cause guilt; suggestions that certain things are naturally not harmful to humans; the “notion”
of harm reified as if it were natural either by objective analysis or assumption of some unstated definition. Some discussions about prosociality or helping imply an
objective harm.
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Welfare, pathology, prevention, protection, well-being, marginalization, treatment, guilt, immoral, violation, harm, stress, prosocial, condemnation, detrimental
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Key terms

N/A

Related codes
Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar
Atypical
exemplar
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Mnemonic
Short
description
Detailed
description
Inclusion criteria

Key terms

Universal, Natural Rationality, Better World
Lack of prosociality or moral exemplarity does not necessarily imply harm. From the researcher’s perspective, doing nothing may or may not be harming
someone, so this implication must be considered in applying this code. Discussions that cast harm, pathology, etc. as culturally-derived value-laden meanings
count as cultural harm.
“The first three measures assessed the degree to which the rater gained an impression of the deceased person’s . . . moral character or immoral character . . .
(i.e., kind-unkind, honest-dishonest, . . . just-unjust . . .) (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014, p. 162).
“a trait’s relevance as an indicator of others’ intentions toward the self, and whether those others are likely to be helpful or harmful, may not tell the whole
story” (Goodwin et al., 2014, p. 165). (using the term harm implies more than merely what that individual is concerned about—the term means something that
should not happen)
10a CULTURAL HARM
Researchers manifest the belief that what counts as harmful or not is inextricable from cultural values and meanings.
Researchers construe the term “harm” or related constructs as cultural ideas, though not ruling out the idea that some aspects of what is considered bad for
humans may be universally shared.
Indications that harm is culturally defined and always depends on what is valued
Implying that “harm” defined is universally understood or that its meaning is natural
11 BETTER WORLD

N/A
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Researchers manifest assumptions about what people should and should not be like, implying that some ways of being are better than others.
Researchers often manifest preferences for better ways of being human over worse ways of being human; discussing prosociality or harm is a direct indication of
values about how people would be to make a better world. Even if it is only in bringing a certain idea to light so that people may attribute cause where it is due,
psychologists also often manifest a desire to help facilitate making the world better.
Indications that researchers think people should be concerned and care for others (within prescribed limits of liberal individual tradition); discussions referencing
prosociality (and sometimes morality when equated with prosociality); implications that people should help, do no harm to others, overcome naturally selfish
tendencies, be peaceable and not severely judgmental (this last also belongs to liberality); implications that psychologists want to understand and facilitate
helpful (prosocial) behaviors and understand and prevent harmful (antisocial) ones; association of antisocial behavior with pathology and problems
Justice, well-being, rights, fairness, care, compassion, prosocial, exemplar, good, moral character, responsibility, prejudice, guilt, harm, bad, immoral, violations,
ethnocentricity, antisocial, pathology, clinical work, therapy, detrimental, implications that research should/will help understanding

Related codes
Exclusion criteria
Typical exemplar

Universal, Harm, Natural Rationality
Using the term “moral” without implying or suggesting that people should or should not be some specified way
“these obituary data provide further support for the important role that moral character information plays in person perception” (Goodwin et al., 2014, p. 165).
(the researchers think moral character is important—it’s not merely a value-free empirically derived claim)
Atypical
“The first three measures assessed the degree to which the rater gained an impression of the deceased person’s . . . moral character or immoral character . . .
exemplar
(i.e., kind-unkind, honest-dishonest, . . . just-unjust . . .) (Goodwin et al., 2014, p. 162). (these terms actually mean good and bad ways of being)
Mnemonic
11a ALOOFNESS (EXCLUSIVE SCIENTIFIC CURIOSITY)
Short
Scientists in the capacity of their research are supposed to manifest no values besides the desire to discover value-free knowledge and employ methods for
description
doing it.
Detailed
Science is supposed to reflect only epistemic values, such as a desire for value-free knowledge and valuing methods for discovering it. Other values (such as
description
caring about the way people feel or behave) are considered nonscientific.
Inclusion criteria
Indications that there are no better or worse ways of being human.
Exclusion criteria Attempts to manifest aloof scientific curiosity when anything in the article implies a better or worse way of being human
Dominant Code Total Interrater Reliability

*Codes with two few hits to calculate a meaningful kappa are designated N/A; blank cells refer to zero coded passages for a code

N/A

0.3032
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TABLE A3 – INTERRATER RELIABILITY DATA SUMMARY

a = agreement to apply code; b = doc 1 yes, doc 2 no; c = doc 1 no, doc 2 yes; d = agreement to not apply code; number of units in parentheses;
empty cells mean no units in the article were coded with this code; N/A means there were not enough coded cells to calculate a meaningful kappa
Aquino (106)
Cushman (30)
Gray (87)
Horberg (88)
Skitka (130)
Totals (441)
Code
a
b
c
d
a
b
c
d
a
b
c
d
a
b
c
d
a
b
c
d
a
b
1 OBSERVABLE EVENTS
53 6
36 11
7
4
12 7
33 9
24 21 40 5
9
34 40
2
63 25
173 26
2 QUANTITATIVE DATA
32 6
10 58
5
1
2
22 29 7
15 36 27 3
4
54 50
2
27 51
143 19
3 ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM
73 7
20 6
20 6
2
2
65 5
15 2
64 7
6
11 102 5
17 6
324 30
4 METHOD-DRIVEN
66 6
24 10
14 0
8
8
45 9
17 16 52 5
17 14 82
4
23 21
260 23
5 PREDICTION
48 6
44 8
9
8
3
10 42 15 18 12 42 9
20 17 61
6
33 30
201 44
6 UNIVERSALITY*
93 9
4
0
23 4
3
0
78 6
5
0
75 10 1
2
118 1
8
3
387 30
7 MECHANISTIC MORALITY
70 3
23 10
19 1
7
3
35 6
33 13 20 18 21 29 35
27 19 49
179 55
8 NATURAL TYPES
4
7
36 59
0
16 0
14 16 48 5
18 34 12 14 28 40
9
25 56
94
92
9 NATURAL RATIONALITY
44 15 15 32
24 1
3
2
54 6
16 11 33 21 14 20 60
18 4
48
215 61
10 NATURAL HARM
37 9
5
55
9
1
9
11 50 18 8
11 48 29 1
10 27
31 5
67
171 88
11 BETTER WORLD
86 3
7
10
15 10 1
4
34 46 4
3
40 37 1
10 34
38 4
54
209 134
1a NONOBSERVABLE
2a QUALITATIVE DATA
2
1
0
104 0
0
1
29 0
1
0
86 0
1
0
87 0
1
4
125 2
4
3a ONTOLOGICAL HOLISM
4a TOPIC-DRIVEN METHOD
5a UNDERSTANDING
6a CONTEXTUALITY
7a MEANINGFUL
0
2
0
128 0
2
MORALITY
8a INTENTIONAL TYPES
9a SITUATED RATIONALITY
0
1
0
86
0
1
0
129 0
2
10a CULTURAL HARM
0
14 0
116 0
14
11a ALOOFNESS
0
30 0
100 0
30
Kappa mean for dominant codes
*code has 2 unit coding error for Gray

Kappa
c
144
58
60
89
118
21
103
80
52
28
17

d
98
221
27
69
77
5
104
175
113
154
81

0.2494
0.6548
0.2450
0.3886
0.2312
0.0694
0.2264
0.1794
0.4108
0.4072
0.2734

5

431

N/A

0

128

N/A

2
1
0

215
116
100

N/A
N/A
N/A
0.3032
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TABLE A4 – FREQUENCY TABLE

1st coder’s data are used; codes with no hits are not listed; blank cells have no hits
Code
Author (number of units)
1-Graham (77)
2-Cushman (30)
3-Tybur (95)
4-Aquino (106)
5-Schnall (21)
6-Sachdeva (32)
7-Leach (107)
8-Valdesolo (7)
9-Eskine (20)
10-Horberg (88)
11-Hutcherson (95)
12-Lammers (38)
13-Moore (34)
14-Skitka (130)
15-Jordan (58)
16-Lee (9)
17-Feinberg (39)
18-Shu (88)
19-Janoff-Bulman (104)
20-Zhong (26)
21-Conway (77)
22-Gray (87)
23-Helzer (29)
24-Wakslak (37)
25-Heflick (68)
Column totals (1502)

1
60
19
64
89
18
16
73
6
15
49
47
26
26
103
43
8
25
51
41
18
72
57
25
32
62
104
5

2

3
48
7
48
42
10
5
55
2
6
31
35
17
16
77
20
6
19
30
25
9
51
44
15
24
20
662

56
22
66
93
17
20
93
7
18
70
66
34
28
119
55
9
32
66
57
22
69
80
26
31
60
1216

4
56
22
66
90
18
21
89
7
16
69
64
34
28
105
54
9
31
66
55
19
67
62
25
31
60
1164

5
56
12
65
92
15
19
75
5
17
62
58
29
34
94
49
7
29
62
52
17
60
60
22
32
59
1072

6
74
26
86
97
12
26
82
7
20
76
92
35
21
126
58
9
35
75
96
23
73
83
24
34
63
1363

7

8
16
26
54
93
18
26
52
7
19
41
36
28
23
54
55
9
15
61
55
23
61
68
24
26
48
938

9
66
77
40

71
8
48
78
1
6
65

28
93
59
21
7

668

10
29
27
47
59
11
20
26
7
15
47
34
6
23
64
39
1
12
37
72
17
65
70
13
17
40
803

11
37
18
22
42
11
25
2
7
6
49
13
26
26
32
53
5
31
72
37
20
55
58
14
15
41
712

38
16
22
93
11
28
91
6
9
41
9
27
25
38
55
6
32
71
52
18
56
38
14
30
39
865

1a

2a

1
1

3

9

4

6
4

3

1
26

Note: Code numbers refer to codes as follows: 1 = Observable events, 2 = Quantitative data, 3 = Dualism, 4 = Method-driven, 5 = Prediction, 6 = Universal,
7 = Mechanistic, 8 = Natural Types, 9 = Natural rationality, 10 = Harm, 11 = Better world, 1a = Nonobservable events, 2a = Qualitative data
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TABLE A5 – CODING RESULTS

a = agreement to code, b = doc 1 yes, doc 2 no; c = doc 1 no, doc 2 yes; d = agreement to not code; P(observed) = a + d/N; Kappa = (P[o] – P[expected])/N - (P[expected])

Code 1 – Observable (Kappa = 0.2494)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 53
b= 6
0
c= 36
d=11
K = 0.142
89
17
P(o) = 64/106 = 0.6038; P(e) = 0.5384
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 7
b= 4
0
c=12
d= 7
K = 0.004
19
11
P(o) = 14/30 = 0.4667; P(e) = 0.4644
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=33
b= 9
0
c=24
d=21
K = 0.249
57
30
P(o) = 54/87 = 0.6207; P(e) = .4946
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=40 b= 5
0
c= 9
d=34
K = 0.681
49
39
P(o) = 74/88 = 0.8409; P(e) = 0.5013
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 40
b= 2
0
c= 63
d=25
K = 0.171
103
27
P(o) = 65/130 = 0.50; P(e) = 0.3966

59
47
106

11
19
30

42
45
87

45
43
88

42
88
130

Code 2 – Quantitative (Kappa = 0.6548)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a=32
b= 6
38
0
c=10
d=58
68
K = 0.678
42
64
106
P(observed) = 90/106 = 0.8491; P(e) = 0.5294
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 5
b= 1
0
c= 2
d= 22
K = 0.706
7
23
P(o) = 27/30 = 0.90; P(e) = 0.66
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=29
b= 7
0
c=15
d=36
K = 0.495
44
43
P(o) = 65/87 = 0.7471; P(e) = 0.4990
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
1
a=27
0
c= 4
K = 0.824
31
P(o) = 81/88 – 0.9205
Skitka
Document
2

0
b= 3
d=54
57

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 50
b= 2
0
c= 27
d=51
K = 0.570
77
53
P(o) = 101/130 = 0.7769; P(e) = 0.4815

6
24
30

36
51
87

30
58
88

52
78
130
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Code 3 – Dualism (Kappa = 0.2450)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 73
b= 7
0
c= 20
d= 6
K = 0.172
93
13
P(o) = 79/106 = 0.7453; P(e) = 0.6922
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=20
b=6
0
c= 2
d=2
K = 0.189
22
8
P(o) = 22/30 = 0.7333; P(e) = 0.6711
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 65
b= 5
0
c= 15
d= 2
K = 0.059
80
7
P(o) = 67/89 = 0.7701; P(e) = 0.7556
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 64
b= 7
0
c= 6
d=11
K = 0.536
70
18
P(o) = 64/88 = 0.8523; P(e) = 0.6813
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=102
b=5
0
c= 17
d=6
K = 0.269
119
11
P(o) = 108/130 = 0.8308; P(e) = 0.7684

80
26
106

26
4
30

70
17
87

71
17
88

107
23
130

Code 4 – Method driven (Kappa = 0.3886)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 66
b= 6
72
0
c= 24
d=10
34
K = 0.245
80
16
106
P(o) = 76/106 = 0.7170; P(e) = 0.6251
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=14
b= 0
0
c= 8
d= 8
K = 0.483
22
8
P(o) = 22/30 = 0.7333; P(e) = 0.4844
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 45
b= 9
0
c= 17
d=16
K = 0.334
62
25
P(o) = 61/87 = 0,7011; P(e) = 0.5513
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 52
b= 5
0
c= 17
d=14
K = 0.399
69
19
P(o) = 66/88 = 0.75; P(e) = 0.5839
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 82
b= 4
0
c= 23
d=21
K = 0.482
105
25
P(o) = 103/130 = 0.7923; P(e) = 0.5994

14
16
30

54
33
87

57
31
88

86
44
130
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Code 5 – Prediction (Kappa = 0.2312)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a=48
b=6
0
c=44
d=8
K = 0.043
92
14
P(o) = 56/105 = 0.5283; P(e) = 0.5069
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 9
b= 8
0
c= 3
d=10
K = 0.286
12
18
P(o) = 19/30 = 0.6333; P(e) = 0.4867
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 42
b=15
0
c= 18
d=12
K = 0.140
60
27
P(o) = 54/87 = 0.6207; P(e) = 0.5589
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 42
b= 9
0
c= 20
d=17
K = 0.295
62
26
P(o) = 59/88 = 0.6705; P(e) = 0.5325
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 61
b= 6
0
c= 33
d=30
K = 0.392
94
36
P(o) = 91/130 = 0.70; P(e) = 0.5069

54
52
106

17
13
30

57
30
87

51
37
88

67
63
130

Code 6 – Universality (Kappa = 0.0694)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 93
b= 9
0
c= 4
d= 0
K = -0.055
97
9
P(o) = 93/106 = 0.8774; P(e) = 0.8838
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=23
b= 4
0
c= 3
d= 0
K = -0.129
26
4
P(o) = 23/30 = 0.7667; P(e) = 0.7933
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 78
b=6
0
c= 5
d=0
K = -0.065
83
6
P(o) = 78/89 = 0.8764; P(e) = 0.884
*coding error (1 point of 88 units)
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 75
b=10
0
c= 1
d= 2
K = 0.224
76
12
P(o) = 77/88 = 0.875; P(e) = 0.8388
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=118
b= 1
0
c= 8
d= 3
K = 0.372
126
4
P(o) = 121/130 = 0.9308; P(e) = 0.8898

102
4
106

27
3
30

84
5
89*

85
3
88

119
11
130

81

Code 7 – Mechanistic morality (0.2264)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 70
b= 3
73
0
c= 23
d=10
33
K = 0.314
93
13
106
P(o) = 80/106 = 0.7547; P(e) = 0.6424

Code 8 – Natural types (0.1794)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 4
b= 7
0
c=36
d=59
K = -0.007
40
66
P(o) = 63/106 = 0.5943; P(e) = 0.5972

Cushman
Document
2

Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=19
b= 1
0
c= 7
d= 3
K = -.294
26
4
P(o) = 22/26 = 0.7333; P(e) = 0.6222
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=35 b= 6
0
c=33
d=13
K = 0.132
68
19
P(o) = 48/87 = 0.5517; P(e) = 0.4838
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=20 b=18
0
c=21
d=29
K = 0.105
41
47
P(o) = 49/88 = 0.5568; P(e) = 0.5046
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=35 b=27
0
c=19
d=49
K = 0.287
54
76
P(o) = 84/130 = 0.6462; P(e) = 0.5039

20
10
30

41
46
87

38
50
88

62
68
130

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 0
b= 16
0
c= 0
d= 14
K = 0.000
0
30
P(o) = 14/30 = 0.4667; P(e) = (0.4667)
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 16
b=48
0
c= 5
d=18
K = 0.020
21
66
P(o) = 34/87 = 0.3908; P(e) = 0.3781
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 34
b=12
0
c= 14
d=28
K = 0.407
48
40
P(o) = 62/88 = 0.7045; P(e) = 0.5021
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 40
b= 9
0
c= 25
d=56
K = 0.477
65
65
P(o) = 96/130 = 0.7385; P(e) = 0.50

11
95
106

16
14
30

64
23
87

46
42
88

49
81
130

82

Code 9 – Natural rationality (Kappa = 0.4108)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 44
b=15
59
0
c= 15
d=32
47
K = 0.427
59
47
106
P(o) = 76/106 = 0.7170; P(e) = 0.5064

Code 10 – Natural Harm (Kappa = 0.4072)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 37
b= 9
46
0
c= 5
d=55
60
K = 0.728
42
64
106
P(o) = 92/106 = 0.8679; P(e) = 0.5137

Cushman
Document
2

Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=24
b= 1
0
c= 3
d= 2
K = 0.429
27
3
P(o) = 26/30 = 0.8667; P(e) = 0.7667
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 54
b= 6
0
c= 16
d=11
K = 0.342
70
17
P(o) = 65/87 = 0.7471; P(e) = 0.6155
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=33 b=21
0
c=14
d=20
K = 0.192
47
41
P(o) = 53/88 = 0.6023; P(e) = 0.5077
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 60
b=18
0
c= 4
d=48
K = 0.663
64
66
P(o) = 108/130 = 0.8308; P(e) = 0.4985

25
5
30

60
27
87

54
34
88

78
52
130

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 9
b= 1
0
c= 9
d=11
K = 0.375
18
12
P(o) = 20/30 = 0.6667; P(e) = 0.4667
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a= 50
b=18
0
c= 8
d=11
K = 0.264
58
29
P(o) = 61/87 = 0.7011; P(e) = 0.5939
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=48 b=29
0
c= 1
d=10
K = 0.255
49
39
P(o) = 58/88 = 0.6591; P(e) = 0.5426
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=27 b=31
0
c= 5
d=67
K = 0.414
32
98
P(o) = 94/130 = 0.7231; P(e) = 0.5273

10
20
30

68
19
87

77
11
88

58
72
130

83

Code 11 – Better world (Kappa = 0.2734)
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a= 86
b= 3
89
0
c= 7
d=10
17
K = 0.613
93
13
106
P(o) = 96/106 = 0.9057; P(e) = 0.7563
Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=15
b=10
0
c= 1
d= 4
K = 0.233
16
14
P(o) = 19/30 = 0.6333; P(e) = 0.5222
Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=34 b=46
0
c= 4
d= 3
K = -0.039
38
49
P(o) = 37/87 = 0.4253; P(e) = 0.4470
Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=40 b=37
0
c= 1
d=10
K = 0.178
41
47
P(o) = 50/88 = 0.5682; P(e) = 0.47.44
Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
0
1
a=34 b=38
0
c= 4 d=54
K = 0.382
38
92
P(o) = 88/130 = 0.6769; P(e) = 0.4776

25
5
30

80
7
87

77
11
88

Code 2a – Qualitative data
Aquino
Document 1
Document
1
2
1
a=2
0
c=0
2

0
b= 1
d=104
105

3
104
107

Cushman
Document
2

Document 1
1
1
a=0
0
c=1
1

0
b= 0
d=29
29

0
30
30

Gray
Document
2

Document 1
1
1
a=0
0
c=0
0

0
b= 1
d=86
87

1
86
87

Horberg
Document
2

Document 1
1
1
a=0
0
c=0
0

0
b= 1
d=87
88

1
87
88

Skitka
Document
2

Document 1
1
1
a=0
0
c=4
4

0
b= 1
d=125
126

1
129
130

72
58
130
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Code 7a – Meaningful morality
Skitka
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a=0 b= 2
0
c=0 d=128
0
130
Code 9a – Situated rationality
Gray
Document 1
Document
1
0
2
1
a=0 b= 1
0
c=0 d=86
0
87

Skitka
Document
2
2
128
130

1
86
87

Document 1
1
1
a=0
0
c=0
0

0
b= 1
d=129
130

1
129
130

Code 10a – Cultural harm
Skitka
Document 1
Document
1
2
1
a=0
0
c=0
0

0
b= 14
d=116
130

14
116
130

Code 11a – Aloofness
Skitka
Document 1
Document
1
2
1
a=0
0
c=0
0

0
b= 30
d=100
130

30
100
130
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TABLE A6 – CULTURAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS - MAJOR THEMES
Related codes
Dualism
Method-driven,
Better world,
Dualism, Prediction
Dualism, Harm,
Better world,
Mechanistic,
Natural rationality
Mechanistic,
Dualism, Natural
rationality
Better world,
Harm, Mechanistic,
Natural rationality
Better world,
Natural rationality,
Harm, Dualism
Better world, Harm
Mechanistic, Harm,
Natural rationality
Harm
Mechanistic,
Natural rationality
Mechanistic
Mechanistic,
Natural rationality,
Better world
Better world, Harm

Theme
While people are always subject to the influence of biases and values, scientific researchers are able to avoid subjective influences to produce
objective and value-free knowledge.
Sound method is supposed to facilitate objective understanding of morality.
Researchers avoid “hunches” and provide objective knowledge for understanding the foundations and functions of morality, confirming what is and
is not harmful.
Moral judgments are largely irrational.
Some levels of moral thinking are superior to others. Irrational judgments are a problem for society. Some moral judgments are rational and
appropriate, while others are subject to strong intuitive influences. Conservatives and liberals are at different stages of moral development.
Certain highly contested issues such as prostitution, smoking, and casual sex do not pose real danger to others. Many behaviors are harm-free,
though they are judged and punished harshly in society.
If a behavior does not pose real danger to others, judging it harshly is irrational and detrimental.
Evolved sensitivity to disgust gives rise to prejudices and harsh judgments.
Those whose moral compasses are guided by not harming others believe killing is wrong regardless of context.
Behaviors are governed by subjective senses reflecting evolved needs. One of these is the need for self-consistency. Moral behaviors evolved
through natural selection.
People are manipulated by environmental triggers to behave in certain ways.
Priming with cleanliness reminders, disgusting tastes, moral codes, etc., causes people to change their behaviors.
Phobias, prejudice, discrimination, inequality, dishonesty, violence, and severe moral judgments are harmful social ills.
Equality, volunteering, empathic concern, tolerance, and moral outrage against inequality are social goods.

Better world, Harm

Clashing political views are problems psychologists hope to illuminate.

Better world, Harm,
Natural rationality,
Natural types

Conservative ideology is more demanding and less rational; liberal ideology is more egalitarian and less harmful.
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Better world, Harm

TABLE A7 - ONTOLOGICAL DUALISM

The value-free ideal is characterized by objective and unbiased reports, while people’s understandings and moral judgments are considered subjective and biased.
Article
“Objective” assertions of subjectivity
Why is this dualism?
1-Graham JPSP
While people frame moral texts according to their values making
People perceive and frame discourse according to their own values, yet scientists are
“policies seem morally good or bad” (p. 1038), content analysis of
supposed to be able to avoid such subjective perceptions and framing in their
moral texts is the “most objective approach” to analyzing linguistic
research and reports.
data (p. 1039).
2-Cushman PS
Studies provide evidence that intention principle dilemmas are
Sound methods permit researchers to make objective judgments about the nature of
unavailable to conscious reasoning—intuitive judgments lacking
subjective moral judgments.
complexity (p. 1087).
3-Tybur JPSP
Studies reveal that disgust sensitivity shapes many social processes
While many social processes are subject to the influence of disgust, researchers avoid
including prejudice, providing critical understanding of “the origin of
such influence to objectively reveal the origins of many behaviors.
our emotional responses” (p. 118).
4-Aquino JPSP
Researchers are able to predict when “situational factors can be
People behave as manipulated by environmental triggers, but researchers are able to
expected to influence moral actions” (p. 138).
avoid such triggers in research and reporting.
5-Schnall PS
“[A]ctivating intuitions about cleanliness” reduces “moral
While disgust is largely responsible for moral judgments, researchers’ objective
condemnation” (p. 1222).
reports avoid such irrelevant influences.
6-Sachdeva PS
Researchers provide “direct evidence” that priming people to feel
While people’s behaviors are governed by subjective senses reflecting evolved needs,
immoral causes altruistic behavior due to the evolved need for a
researchers are able to avoid subjective senses in their research to produce objective
subjective sense of self-consistency (p. 525).
evidence.
7-Leach JPSP
“Because the vast majority of research on the ascription of
However people feel about the importance of in-group morality, “we know very
characteristics to groups has not examined morality, we know very
little” until objective methods reveal such knowledge (p. 235).
little about its importance to positive evaluation” (p. 235), yet the
researchers show that morality is most important to in-group
evaluation.
8-Valdesolo PS
Competition between automatic cognitive (intuitive) processes and
Moral judgments are subject to intuition, but researchers are able to avoid its
cognitive (deliberative) reasoning leads to “logically [in]appropriate”
influence to produce object knowledge about what is behind “appropriate” moral
moral judgments (p. 476).
judgments (p. 476).
9-Eskine PS
Researchers provide “evidence” of the irrelevant influence of disgust People’s judgments are subjective, but researchers avoid such influences on their
(p. 298), showing that morality is merely a matter of taste.
judgments about what is worth studying or emphasizing to provide objective
“evidence” (p. 298).
10-Horberg
Society’s punishments and sanctions are based on subjective
Researchers avoid “hunches” and provide objective knowledge for understanding the
JPSP
hunches about what is morally wrong, even when behaviors are
foundations and functions of morality, confirming what is and is not harmful.
“harm-free” (p. 965).
11-Hutcherson
Researchers expect future studies to “elaborate the necessary and
Sound research enables scientists to objectively ascertain “necessary and sufficient”
JPSP
sufficient appraisals that elicit [the other-condemning] emotions” (p. conditions, including the emotions that govern social behaviors. Though science is a
733), explaining “the adaptive role that emotions play in relations
social enterprise, it is able to produce objective knowledge.
between individuals, groups, and cultures” (p. 720).
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12-Lammers PS

Researchers induce a sense of power and turn participants into
moral hypocrites, demonstrating “inequality-reinforcing processes”
(p. 743).

People are cast as if continually subject to influences governing their behaviors and
judgments, yet researchers are able to produce objective knowledge uninfluenced by
“a sense of power.”

13-Moore PS

“Hot” processes that “[bias] against responding in a way that causes
harm” (p. 550) compete with deliberative cognitive processes in
moral judgments.
People believe their own versions of morality are universal, while
their justifications for action are actually blind to “facts” (p. 896).
Moral behavior predictably “fluctuates over time as a function of
self-perception of the current completeness of the moral self” (p.
710).
Participants induced to lie by email were willing to pay more for
hand sanitizer, while those who lied by voicemail were willing to pay
more for mouthwash (p. 1423).
Changing the framing of issues manipulates more support for proenvironmental messages.
“Determinants of honesty do not lie completely within the
individual” (p. 344). People naturally “categorize their own actions in
positive terms, thereby avoiding the need to negatively update their
moral self-image” (p. 333).
“Organisms attuned to bad outcomes would be more likely to
survive, because there are greater consequences of ignoring
harmful, dangerous outcomes than positive outcomes” (p. 524).
Discrimination stems from evolved subjective perceptions, but
“there are social behaviors while different, engender no real danger
to others” (p. 861).
Mathematical equations capture each element of the judgment
process to predict how people will respond in specific dilemmas.

Researchers are able to escape subjective biases in demonstrating objective
explanations about moral judgments.

“[I]n the mind of the perceiver, a villain cannot suddenly transform
into a victim, nor can someone categorized as a benefactor easily
change into a beneficiary” (p. 507).
“[H]ypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior stem from
irrelevant cues (p. 517).
Passive exposure to system justification reduces feelings of
inequality-related distress, while moral outrage predicts support for
redistribution.
When induced to focus on appearance, women, but not men, are
perceived as lower in warmth, competence, and morality.

Sound methods allow researchers to be disinterested observers rather than
subjective perceivers in order to produce objective knowledge about moral
perceptions.
While evaluations are subject to irrelevant influences, researchers find objective
“evidence of a deep link between physical purity and moral judgment” (p. 517).
Researchers are able to avoid subjective influences to objectively demonstrate how
attitudes are governed by subjective perceptions of external cues.

14-Skitka JPSP
15-Jordan PSPB
16-Lee PS
17-Feinberg PS
18-Shu PSPB

19-JanoffBulman JPSP
20-Zhong JESP
21-Conway
JPSP
22-Gray JPSP
23-Helzer PS
24-Wakslak PS
25-Heflick JESP

Sound method is supposed to facilitate objective “social psychological understanding
of morality” (p. 915).
Researchers, ostensibly freed by methods from subjective perceptions, can predict
and objectively explain moral behaviors.
While people’s behaviors are predictable and manipulable, researchers using sound
methods are able to avoid subjectivity in their research.
While the framing of an issue governs people’s perceptions, researchers are able to
avoid such framing influences to produce objective knowledge.
Researchers are able to produce not only honest, but objective knowledge in their
research, avoiding the “determinants” grounded outside of the individual and in
needs for subjective self-perceptions.
While evolution dictates the subjective perceptional nature of moral systems, the
researchers are able to avoid such subjectivity and objectively demonstrate the
superiority of the prescriptive over the proscriptive system.
Researchers avoid subjective perceptions to assert what counts as “real danger to
others” (p. 861).
Though judgments are subjective, objective and value-free mathematical equations
render them predictable.

Researchers avoid subjective perceptions to demonstrate how subjective perceptions
that objectify women are manipulable.
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TABLE A8 - MORAL PROBLEMS
Article
1-Graham JPSP
2-Cushman PS
3-Tybur JPSP
4-Aquino JPSP

Moral problems
America’s intractable “culture war” makes it difficult to get along.
Moral judgments governed by automatic processes could be problematic.
Social costs of evolved spandrel-like qualities of disgust include phobias and prejudice.
All humans act both morally and immorally as determined by environmental situations.

5-Schnall PS

Disgust leads people to make unduly severe moral judgments of behaviors that are not legitimately
harmful.
People behave both morally and immorally as governed by principles of maintaining a comfortable
moral self-image.
Misunderstanding the importance of in-group morality could be problematic for understanding
intergroup relations.
Ethical choice often does not stem from deliberative analysis but rather from competing automatic
processes.
Disgust influences harsh judgments about moral behaviors.

6-Sachdeva PS
7-Leach JPSP
8-Valdesolo PS
9-Eskine PS
10-Horberg JPSP
11-Hutcherson JPSP
12-Lammers PS
13-Moore PS
14-Skitka JPSP
15-Jordan PSPB
16-Lee PS
17-Feinberg PS
18-Shu PSPB
19-Janoff-Bulman JPSP
20-Zhong JESP
21-Conway JPSP
22-Gray JPSP
23-Helzer PS
24-Wakslak PS

Not only are people often dishonest, but they often self-justify and morally disengage, leading to
further dishonesty.
Proscriptive morality regulating “lifestyle” behaviors is less conducive to a moral society.
Irrelevant cues cause discrimination and prejudice against those who engage in behaviors that are
not legitimately harmful.
Misunderstanding the competing nature of multiple processes in moral judgments could be
problematic. For example, utilitarian judgments may be cast as antithetical to empathic concern.
Subjective perceptions of moral agency and patiency result in inappropriate help and harm.
Common reminders of physical cleanliness lead to “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual
behavior (p. 517).
People maintain the legitimacy of inequality through system justification and the ineffective nature
of inward focused guilt.
A society that emphasizes the appearance of women facilitates their dehumanization.

“[H]aving salient situational cues available” (p. 139) could help
people maintain access to their moral identity.
“[A]ctivating intuitions about cleanliness” may reduce the severity of
moral judgments (p. 1222).
People should practice “costly” moral behaviors until they become
automatic (p. 528).
Inducing a positive affect “optimizes” a decision in which negative
intuitions must be overcome (p. 477).
Perhaps jurors should “avoid overly bitter or sweet foods as they
deliberate a verdict” (p. 298).
Framing issues that cross moral domains in terms of freedom and
rights rather than purity would reduce disgust and moralization.

Tainting the reputations of the powerful may inspire them to “bring
their behavior back to their espoused standards” (p. 743).

Reframing environmental discourse in terms of purity could “reduce
the gap” between conflicting groups (p. 56).
“[S]igning a moral code can completely eliminate dishonesty” (p.
344).
Emphasizing a prescriptive over a proscriptive moral system will
result in dispositional morality over strict self-regulation.

“[A] particularly effective technique for many purposes of selfpresentation would be casting oneself as a moral patient” (p. 519).
Moral outrage should be sustained to facilitate efforts against an
unjust system.
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25-Heflick JESP

Amplification of moral judgments elicited by disgust results in condemnation of purity violations
that are not legitimately harmful.
Evolved emotions may be associated with “prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehumanized
minorities” (p. 723).
The powerful engage in moral hypocrisy, while the powerless engage in hypercrisy, helping to
maintain inequality.
Moral dilemma responses subject to emotional “biases against responding in a way that causes
harm” (p. 550) could be problematic.
Besides being irrational, moral convictions are potentially dangerous and associated with horrific
behaviors.
Moral licensing causes people to act immorally.
Irrelevant triggers governing moral judgments could be problematic.
Environmental issues are plagued by poor communication between political groups.

Suggestions for alleviating moral problems

TABLE A9 - HARM AND NOT HARM
Article
1-Graham JPSP
2-Cushman PS
3-Tybur JPSP
4-Aquino JPSP
5-Schnall PS
6-Sachdeva PS
7-Leach JPSP
8-Valdesolo PS
9-Eskine PS
10-Horberg JPSP
11-Hutcherson JPSP
12-Lammers PS
13-Moore PS
14-Skitka JPSP
15-Jordan PSPB
16-Lee PS
17-Feinberg PS
18-Shu PSPB
19-Janoff-Bulman JPSP

Potentially harmful
killing, racism, fascism, blind obedience, stigma, blood feuds, selfishness, inequality & its
acceptance
death – more is worse than less, regardless of action, contact, or intention
clinical disorders, compulsions, & phobias, prejudice, ethnocentrism, social exclusion,
stigma & responses to it, social costs of disgust-induced moral judgments, irrational
motivations to punish norm-violators, lying, cheating, stealing
selfishness, lying, barbarism, self-condemnation
severe moral judgments made by incidental & irrelevant intuitions against “moral
transgressions that go beyond principles of harm or fairness” (p. 1222)
moral licensing, cheating, not cooperating with others toward the good of the
environment, administering shocks, disloyalty, greed, meanness, selfishness, prejudice,
sexism, racism, taking advantage of the poor
dishonesty, insincerity
death—more is worse than less regardless of action, contact, or intention
irrational harsh moral judgments
irrational condemnation and severe punishment of purity violations such as casual sex
prejudice toward the most stigmatized, dehumanized minorities, embezzling from a bank,
faking an injury to collect on insurance, putting cyanide in a yogurt container at a
supermarket
moral hypocrisy, cheating, social inequality, entitlement, moral hypercrisy
death – more is worse than less regardless of action, contact, or intention
moral convictions, violence, intolerance, maximum moral engagement, deep moral
cleavages, cognitive inflexibility, resisting counterfactual reasoning
cheating, moral licensing, sexism, racism, a salient state moral self-image
lying, avoiding contact with morally tainted people
not caring about the environment
dishonesty, self-justification, moral disengagement, standing by when another commits
atrocious acts, cheating on a spouse, dehumanizing victims, insulting another person,
abusing a controlled substance, morally lenient environments
proscriptive moral systems, harshness and condemnation
irrational discrimination and prejudice stemming from the “potential unintended
consequences of cleanliness”, severe moral judgments “on morally contested issues such
as abortion and pornography” (p. 859).

21-Conway JPSP

stereotypes, racism, violence, death, acceptance of harm (pitted against genuine moral
concern, p. 228)
killing, stealing, violence, bodily injury, not caring for the environment, unfairness, possibly
unfair allocation of harm and help
unintended effects of cleanliness reminders, irrational “hypervigilant” moral evaluations
of sexual behavior”
inequality, system-justification, privilege, impoverishment, suffering, victimization
dehumanization, objectification, appearance focus, social inequality between sexes

22-Gray JPSP
23-Helzer PS
24-Wakslak PS
25-Heflick JESP

“moral transgressions that go beyond principles of harm or fairness” (p. 1222)

“eating a small cloned strip of one’s own muscle tissue” (p. 965), “having sex
with a dead chicken” (p. 966)

legal abortion, stem cell research, gay marriage (at least these should not
cause great concern)
abortion, adultery, alcoholic, casual sex, recreational drug use, wearing animal
fur, homosexuality, littering, masturbation, obesity, pollution, pornography,
premarital sex, profane language, prostitution, and smoking (survey items of
“social behaviors [that] engender no real danger to others” (p. 862)

“violations of sexual purity” (p. 517): homosexuality, abortion, pornography,
masturbation, brother-sister sex, etc.
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20-Zhong JESP

Not legitimately harmful
“many issues related to food, sex, clothing, prayer, and gender roles [treated]
as moral issues even when they involve no harm to any person” (p. 1030)

TABLE A10 - CONSERVATIVE VS. LIBERAL MORALITY
Article
1-Graham JPSP

Conservative Ideology
-uniquely associated with “the binding foundations,” which can “motivate horrific
behavior” (p. 1040)
-Ingroup/loyalty—related to racism
-Authority/respect—related to fascism, blind obedience
-Purity/sanctity—related to stigma
-“constrained vision”
-authority, institutions, and traditions needed to live civilly (pp. 1029-1030)
-pessimistic view of human nature & human imperfectability
-“preference for things that are familiar, stable, and predictable”
-“suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions
-binding individuals into roles and duties (p. 1030)
-“ethic of community”—moral goods such as obedience, duty, interdependence,
cohesiveness of institutions
-“ethic of divinity”—purity, sanctity, and the suppression of humanity’s baser, more
carnal instincts
-“positional ideology”
-“reaction” to challenges
-“stronger emotional sensitivity to threats to the social order”; limiting liberties in
defense of that order
-“loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice for the group, combined with an extreme
vigilance for traitors” (p. 1031)
-“the two core aspects of conservative ideology are resistance to change and
acceptance of inequality” (p. 1030)
-“treat many issues as moral issues . . . even when they involve no harm to any
person” (p. 1030)
-“the political right includes libertarians and “laissez-faire” conservatives who prize
individual liberty as essential to the functioning of the free market”

Liberal Ideology
-uniquely associated with “the individualizing foundations” of morality (p. 1040)
-Harm/care
-Fairness/reciprocity—related to justice & blood feuds
-“unconstrained vision” – people should be left as free as possible to pursue
personal development” (p. 1029),
-optimistic view of human nature & human perfectibility
-“open to experience”, “inclined to seek out change and novelty”
-manage selfishness by teaching individuals to respect the rights of others
-“ethics of autonomy” (p. 1030)
-“reciprocal altruism”
-“ethic of care”
-“ethic of justice”
-“emphasis on the rights and welfare of individuals”(p. 1031)
-“The political left has sometimes been associated with socialism and communism,
positions that privilege the welfare of the group over the rights of the individual
and that have at times severely limited individual liberty.”

9-Eskine PS

-more vulnerable than liberals” to the influence of “extraneous emotions” (p. 298);
more associated with irrational harsh judgments
-associated with disgust, moralization of the purity domain, condemnation of
violators
-inducing disgust strengthens irrational, harmful harsh judgments about behaviors
that do not involve harm
-at a different “stage of moral development” so environmental message must be
reframed to “improve communication between opposing sides” (p. 61)
-less concerned about the environment
-associated with blame-worthy proscriptive lifestyle issues & self-monitoring
-less conducive to a moral society

-moral processing less vulnerable to influence of extraneous emotions

10-Horberg JPSP

17-Feinberg PS
19-Janoff-Bulman
JPSP
23-Helzer PS

-in line with proenvironmental attitudes
-perceive environmental issues as moral issues
-associated with the credit-worthy prescriptive equity issues and positive
obligations and activation
-likely to lead to a more moral society

-associated with “hypervigilant” moral evaluations of sexual behavior” & “deep link”
between physical purity and moral judgment (p. 517).
-associated with disgust that figures in judgments of sexual moral violations (p. 521).
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